Scoring Nim
Hiromi Oginuma, Masato Shinoda
TL;DR
This work introduces Scoring Nim, a scoring extension of Nim where each stone yields 1 point and the last stone yields an additional real-valued bonus $N$, unifying normal, greedy, and misère-like behaviors as $N$ varies. It formalizes a payoff function $f_N$ that captures the final score difference under optimal play and develops recursive, continuity, and large-scale structural properties. The authors derive explicit results for the two-pile case, establish general reduction and symmetry properties for general $n$, and perform a detailed analysis of the three-pile case, revealing intricate breakpoint structures and regime-dependent strategies. The findings illuminate how scoring incentives reshape optimal play in Nim variants and contribute to the broader study of scoring impartial games with potential for further theoretical exploration and applications in game design and analysis.
Abstract
Nim is a well-known combinatorial game, in which two players alternately remove stones from distinct piles. A player who removes the last stone wins under the normal play rule, while a player loses under the misère play rule. In this paper, we propose a new variant of Nim with scoring that generalizes both the normal and misère play versions of Nim as special cases. We study the theoretical aspects of this extended game and analyze its fundamental properties, such as optimal strategies and payoff functions.
