No Data, No Optimization: A Lightweight Method To Disrupt Neural Networks With Sign-Flips
Ido Galil, Moshe Kimhi, Ran El-Yaniv
TL;DR
This work uncovers a data-free vulnerability in deep neural networks where flipping a small number of sign bits in parameters can cause drastic accuracy loss. It introduces Deep Neural Lesion (DNL), a lightweight, pass-free attack that identifies and flips critical parameters, and an enhanced 1P-DNL variant that uses a single forward/backward pass to increase impact. The authors demonstrate broad effectiveness across architectures and datasets, including ImageNet-scale models, and propose a practical defense by selectively protecting the most vulnerable sign bits. The study highlights significant security implications for deployed DNNs and motivates defenses at the parameter and hardware levels to mitigate sign-bit attacks.
Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) can be catastrophically disrupted by flipping only a handful of sign bits in their parameters. We introduce Deep Neural Lesion (DNL), a data-free, lightweight method that locates these critical parameters and triggers massive accuracy drops. We validate its efficacy on a wide variety of computer vision models and datasets. The method requires no training data or optimization and can be carried out via common exploits software, firmware or hardware based attack vectors. An enhanced variant that uses a single forward and backward pass further amplifies the damage beyond DNL's zero-pass approach. Flipping just two sign bits in ResNet50 on ImageNet reduces accuracy by 99.8\%. We also show that selectively protecting a small fraction of vulnerable sign bits provides a practical defense against such attacks.
