Unsafe LLM-Based Search: Quantitative Analysis and Mitigation of Safety Risks in AI Web Search
Zeren Luo, Zifan Peng, Yule Liu, Zhen Sun, Mingchen Li, Jingyi Zheng, Xinlei He
TL;DR
This work provides the first quantitative Safety Risk Analysis of seven production AI-powered search engines (AIPSEs), revealing that harmful content and malicious URLs frequently appear in responses even for benign queries. It introduces a formal threat model and three query types, builds a dataset from PhishTank, ThreatBook, and LevelBlue, and systematically evaluates risk across production AIPSEs versus traditional search engines. The study finds that natural-language queries generally reduce risk, while URL-based inputs can worsen risk, and demonstrates two real-world case studies illustrating deception vectors. To mitigate these risks, the authors propose an agent-based defense combining a content refinement tool and multiple URL detectors, with HtmlLLM-Detector delivering the strongest protection (F1=0.822; 78.3% risk reduction). The results underscore an urgent need for robust safety filters in AIPSEs and provide practical defense mechanisms and evaluation benchmarks for future work.
Abstract
Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced the capabilities of AI-Powered Search Engines (AIPSEs), offering precise and efficient responses by integrating external databases with pre-existing knowledge. However, we observe that these AIPSEs raise risks such as quoting malicious content or citing malicious websites, leading to harmful or unverified information dissemination. In this study, we conduct the first safety risk quantification on seven production AIPSEs by systematically defining the threat model, risk type, and evaluating responses to various query types. With data collected from PhishTank, ThreatBook, and LevelBlue, our findings reveal that AIPSEs frequently generate harmful content that contains malicious URLs even with benign queries (e.g., with benign keywords). We also observe that directly querying a URL will increase the number of main risk-inclusive responses, while querying with natural language will slightly mitigate such risk. Compared to traditional search engines, AIPSEs outperform in both utility and safety. We further perform two case studies on online document spoofing and phishing to show the ease of deceiving AIPSEs in the real-world setting. To mitigate these risks, we develop an agent-based defense with a GPT-4.1-based content refinement tool and a URL detector. Our evaluation shows that our defense can effectively reduce the risk, with only a minor cost of reducing available information by approximately 10.7%. Our research highlights the urgent need for robust safety measures in AIPSEs.
