Dissecting Submission Limit in Desk-Rejections: A Mathematical Analysis of Fairness in AI Conference Policies
Yuefan Cao, Xiaoyu Li, Yingyu Liang, Zhizhou Sha, Zhenmei Shi, Zhao Song, Jiahao Zhang
TL;DR
This work analyzes fairness in desk-rejection policies under per-author submission caps in AI conferences. It proves that an ideal policy rejecting solely based on an author's excess submissions is impossible when the author set size satisfies $n\ge 3$, and introduces two fairness metrics based on an author-centric cost. The authors show that optimizing individual fairness is NP-hard, while group fairness can be efficiently solved via linear programming, yielding a fairness-aware desk-rejection mechanism. Case studies indicate the LP-based approach achieves greater equity than existing practices (e.g., CVPR 2025), highlighting practical routes to more just conference submission management. The results have implications for policy design and fair evaluation in rapidly growing AI research communities.
Abstract
As AI research surges in both impact and volume, conferences have imposed submission limits to maintain paper quality and alleviate organizational pressure. In this work, we examine the fairness of desk-rejection systems under submission limits and reveal that existing practices can result in substantial inequities. Specifically, we formally define the paper submission limit problem and identify a critical dilemma: when the number of authors exceeds three, it becomes impossible to reject papers solely based on excessive submissions without negatively impacting innocent authors. Thus, this issue may unfairly affect early-career researchers, as their submissions may be penalized due to co-authors with significantly higher submission counts, while senior researchers with numerous papers face minimal consequences. To address this, we propose an optimization-based fairness-aware desk-rejection mechanism and formally define two fairness metrics: individual fairness and group fairness. We prove that optimizing individual fairness is NP-hard, whereas group fairness can be efficiently optimized via linear programming. Through case studies, we demonstrate that our proposed system ensures greater equity than existing methods, including those used in CVPR 2025, offering a more socially just approach to managing excessive submissions in AI conferences.
