Conversation Games and a Strategic View of the Turing Test
Kaveh Aryan
TL;DR
The Conversation game is introduced, a multi-stage, extensive-form game based on linguistic strategic interaction based on linguistic strategic interaction, and it is shown that a strategic agent outperforms a naive agent by a high margin.
Abstract
Although many game-theoretic models replicate real interactions that often rely on natural language, explicit study of games where language is central to strategic interaction remains limited. This paper introduces the \emph{conversation game}, a multi-stage, extensive-form game based on linguistic strategic interaction. We focus on a subset of the games, called verdict games. In a verdict game, two players alternate to contribute to a conversation, which is evaluated at each stage by a non-strategic judge who may render a conclusive binary verdict, or a decision to continue the dialogue. The game ends once a limit is reached or a verdict is given. We show many familiar processes, such as interrogation or a court process fall under this category. We also, show that the Turing test is an instance of verdict game, and discuss the significance of a strategic view of the Turing test in the age of advanced AI deception. We show the practical relevance of the proposed concepts by simulation experiments, and show that a strategic agent outperforms a naive agent by a high margin.