Does multi-block MEV exist? Analysis of 2 years of MEV Data
Pascal Stichler
TL;DR
This study empirically assesses the prevalence and value of multi-block MEV in Ethereum after the 2022 merge by analyzing proposer-builder data and MEV-Boost payments over roughly 4.3 million slots. A Monte Carlo baseline, based on observed daily market shares, is used to contrast the observed frequency of consecutive-slot sequences up to 25 slots. Key findings show significantly fewer multi-slot sequences than expected, while longer sequences command higher average MEV-Boost payments and exhibit only weak autocorrelation, with no strong evidence of builder specialization by base-fee volatility. The results highlight that multi-block MEV strategies are not evidently exploited at scale under current PBS dynamics, though proposed design changes such as APS could reshape incentives and risk considerations for future MEV behavior.
Abstract
This study analyzes proposer-builder data and MEV-Boost payment data following the Ethereum merge in September 2022 to identify patterns of multi-block MEV. Our findings reveal fewer multi-slot sequences of builders than predicted by a random Monte Carlo simulation, with the longest observed sequence spanning 25 slots. Additionally, we observe that average MEV-Boost payments increase with the length of consecutive sequences, from approximately 0.05 ETH for single slots to 0.08 ETH for nine consecutive slots. Within longer sequences, payments per slot show a slight increase, suggesting that builders bid higher for longer sequences or the first slot after a longer sequence. A weak positive autocorrelation is found between subsequent MEV-Boost payments, challenging the hypothesis of alternating periods of low and high MEV. Finally, our comparison of builders during periods of low and high base fee volatility reveals minimal correlation, indicating the absence of builder specialization based on base fee volatility.