Characterization of Invariance, Periodic Solutions and Optimization of Dynamic Financial Networks
Leonardo Stella, Dario Bauso, Franco Blanchini, Patrizio Colaneri
TL;DR
This work addresses the propagation of financial contagion in networks with cross-holdings and asset holdings by modeling the system as a discrete-time monotone dynamical process. It derives conditions for regional attraction and invariance across orthants, demonstrates that periodic solutions longer than two can occur in discrete time, and proposes a minimal-cash-injection strategy to steer the system to the maximal healthy invariant region. The results yield a tractable framework for assessing stability margins under uncertain cross-holdings and for designing interventions to contain contagion. Collectively, the paper provides theoretical tools for systemic-risk management and practical optimization-based strategies to mitigate cascading defaults.
Abstract
Cascading failures, such as bankruptcies and defaults, pose a serious threat for the resilience of the global financial system. Indeed, because of the complex investment and cross-holding relations within the system, failures can occur as a result of the propagation of a financial collapse from one organization to another. While this problem has been studied in depth from a static angle, namely, when the system is at an equilibrium, we take a different perspective and study the corresponding dynamical system. The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we carry out a systematic analysis of the regions of attraction and invariance of the system orthants, defined by the positive and negative values of the organizations' equity. Second, we investigate periodic solutions and show through a counterexample that there could exist periodic solutions of period greater than 2. Finally, we study the problem of finding the smallest cash injection that would bring the system to the maximal invariant region of the positive orthant.
