Growth model with externalities for energetic transition via MFG with common external variable
Pierre Lavigne, Quentin Petit, Xavier Warin
TL;DR
This paper develops a novel mean-field game framework for multi-sector economic growth with a dynamically evolving externality driven by aggregate actions and exposed to common noise. The authors formulate the equilibrium via a stochastic maximum principle, recast it as a forward–backward SDE, and establish existence and uniqueness of a strong MFG equilibrium through a contraction argument; they also derive weak-equilibrium results and discuss a master-equation perspective. Computationally, they propose a fixed-point algorithm augmented with neural-network approximations to solve the resulting high-dimensional system, incorporating a fictitious-time scheme for stability. The numerical study on a two-sector brown/green model illustrates how externalities shape investment, capital dynamics, and a transition toward greener technologies under shared uncertainty. Overall, the work contributes to integrated assessment-type modeling by linking dynamic externalities, common noise, and MFG theory, with practical implications for policy design under environmental uncertainty.
Abstract
This article introduces a novel mean-field game model for multi-sector economic growth in which a dynamically evolving externality, influenced by the collective actions of agents, plays a central role. Building on classical growth theories and integrating environmental considerations, the framework incorporates common noise to capture shared uncertainties among agents about the externality variable. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of a strong mean-field game equilibrium by reformulating the equilibrium conditions as a Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equation under the stochastic maximum principle and establishing a contraction argument to ensure a unique solution. We provide a numerical resolution for a specified model using a fixed-point approach combined with neural network approximations.
