Introducing Post-Quantum algorithms in Open RAN interfaces
Pedro Otero-García, Ana Fernández-Vilas, Manuel Fernández-Veiga
TL;DR
The paper addresses securing Open RAN open interfaces against quantum threats by integrating post-quantum cryptography into IPsec using a hybrid approach that combines classical key exchange with KEMs. It implements four KEMs from liboqs (CRYSTALS-Kyber, BIKE, HQC, Frodo) and evaluates their impact on an Open RAN testbed built with srsRAN and Open5GS, measuring throughput, delay, jitter, memory usage, and encryption time. The results show that Frodo and BIKE offer the best overall balance, with Frodo preserving throughput similar to non-KEM scenarios and BIKE delivering the fastest encryption and lowest latency, while Kyber is more variable and HQC can exhibit higher jitter. The study demonstrates the practicality of PQC for Open RAN interfaces and provides guidance for deployment choices, while outlining future directions including quantum key distribution and broader PQC adoption across TLS, MACsec, and additional interfaces.
Abstract
Nowadays, 5G architecture is characterized by the use of monolithic hardware, where the configuration of its elements is completely proprietary for each manufacturer. In recent years, as an alternative to this centralized architecture, a new model has emerged: the Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN). One of its main features has been the split of the Base Band Unit (BBU) into new simpler hardware with more specific functions approaching to a more modular model. As a consequence of this split, new interfaces appeared to connect these components that need to be protected. With the developments in the field of quantum computing, traditional protection mechanisms for this kind of interfaces may be deprecated in the near future. This security issue motivates this paper, which aims to study how to integrate post-quantum cryptography (PQC) mechanisms to current security standards, such as IPsec and MACsec. In addition, the proposal is also put into practice to compare the performance of traditional mechanisms with PQC implementations. This research shows that the new implementation does not reduce the performance of the aforementioned standards, while the security is reinforced against quantum attacks.
