Effective Two-Stage Double Auction for Dynamic Resource Provision over Edge Networks via Discovering The Power of Overbooking

TL;DR

This work addresses dynamic edge-resource provisioning by introducing a two-stage double auction that leverages resource overbooking to accommodate uncertainty in both edge-server supply and buyer demand. Stage I (OPDAuction) establishes long-term contracts with an overbooking rate to pre-negotiate resource provisioning, while Stage II (RBDAuction) provides a real-time backup mechanism to handle residual demand. The framework maintains key economic properties (truthfulness, individual rationality, budget balance) and is shown to outperform traditional single-stage auctions in social welfare and time efficiency, with a carefully designed risk-control and overbooking optimization. The approach is practically impactful for edge computing, offering scalable, robust resource trading in highly dynamic environments and guiding future research on adaptive overbooking and multi-market extensions.

Abstract

To facilitate responsive and cost-effective computing service delivery over edge networks, this paper investigates a novel two-stage double auction methodology via discovering an interesting idea of resource overbooking to overcome dynamic and uncertain nature of supply of edge servers (sellers) and demand generated from mobile devices (as buyers). The proposed auction integrates multiple essential goals such as maximizing social welfare as well as accelerating the decision-making process from both short-term and long-term views, (e.g., the time for determining winning seller-buyer pairs), by introducing a stagewise strategy: an overbooking-driven pre-double auction (OPDAuction) for determining long-term cooperations between sellers and buyers before practical resource transactions as Stage I, and a real-time backup double auction (RBDAuction) for quickly coping with residual resource demands during actual transactions. In particular, by embedding a proper overbooking rate, OPDAuction helps with facilitating trading contracts between appropriate sellers and buyers as guidance for future transactions, by allowing the booked resources to exceed theoretical supply. Then, since pre-auctions may cause risks, our RBDAuction adjusts to real-time market changes, further enhancing the overall social welfare. More importantly, we offer an interesting view to show that our proposed two-stage auction can support significant design properties such as truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget balance. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate good performance in social welfare, time efficiency, and computational scalability, outstripping conventional methods in dynamic edge computing settings.

Figures (7)

• Figure 1: Schematic of our proposed two-stage double auction. During Stage I: ① Buyers report their information such as demand, bid, attendance probability; ② Sellers report their information such as resource capacity and ask pricing; ③ Auctioneer determines members, long-term contracts and overbooking rate; ④⑤ Auction results (contract terms) are delivered to buyers and sellers. During Stage II: a Volunteers and guests submit demand and bid; b Sellers with remaining resources submit their supply and ask pricing; c Auctioneer decides trading pairs and payment; d e Auction results are delivered to buyers and sellers.
• Figure 2: Advantages brought by two-stage double auction and overbooking in terms of social welfare and time efficiency, via simulations.
• Figure 3: Flow diagram of our proposed OPDAuction.
• Figure 4: Performance comparison.
• Figure 6: Individual rationality.

Theorems & Definitions (15)

• Definition 1
• Definition 2
• Definition 3
• Definition 4
• Definition 5
• Definition 6
• Definition 7
• Theorem 1
• proof
• Theorem 2