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Privacy-Preserving Distributed Defense Framework for DC Microgrids Against Exponentially Unbounded False Data Injection Attacks

Yi Zhang, Mohamadamin Rajabinezhad, Yichao Wang, Junbo Zhao, Shan Zuo

TL;DR

The paper addresses protecting DC microgrids from exponentially unbounded false data injection (EU-FDI) attacks while preserving data privacy. It introduces a fully distributed, consensus-based secondary control augmented with privacy masks and adaptive damping to achieve uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) voltage and current regulation under EU-FDI. The authors provide Lyapunov-based proofs and demonstrate practical viability through hardware-in-the-loop experiments, illustrating resilience to attacks, load variations, and communication failures. This work advances DC MG security by integrating privacy-preserving mechanisms with robust attack-resilient control, offering scalable protection in cyber-physical power systems.

Abstract

This paper introduces a novel, fully distributed control framework for DC microgrids, enhancing resilience against exponentially unbounded false data injection (EU-FDI) attacks. Our framework features a consensus-based secondary control for each converter, effectively addressing these advanced threats. To further safeguard sensitive operational data, a privacy-preserving mechanism is incorporated into the control design, ensuring that critical information remains secure even under adversarial conditions. Rigorous Lyapunov stability analysis confirms the framework's ability to maintain critical DC microgrid operations like voltage regulation and load sharing under EU-FDI threats. The framework's practicality is validated through hardware-in-the-loop experiments, demonstrating its enhanced resilience and robust privacy protection against the complex challenges posed by quick variant FDI attacks.

Privacy-Preserving Distributed Defense Framework for DC Microgrids Against Exponentially Unbounded False Data Injection Attacks

TL;DR

The paper addresses protecting DC microgrids from exponentially unbounded false data injection (EU-FDI) attacks while preserving data privacy. It introduces a fully distributed, consensus-based secondary control augmented with privacy masks and adaptive damping to achieve uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) voltage and current regulation under EU-FDI. The authors provide Lyapunov-based proofs and demonstrate practical viability through hardware-in-the-loop experiments, illustrating resilience to attacks, load variations, and communication failures. This work advances DC MG security by integrating privacy-preserving mechanisms with robust attack-resilient control, offering scalable protection in cyber-physical power systems.

Abstract

This paper introduces a novel, fully distributed control framework for DC microgrids, enhancing resilience against exponentially unbounded false data injection (EU-FDI) attacks. Our framework features a consensus-based secondary control for each converter, effectively addressing these advanced threats. To further safeguard sensitive operational data, a privacy-preserving mechanism is incorporated into the control design, ensuring that critical information remains secure even under adversarial conditions. Rigorous Lyapunov stability analysis confirms the framework's ability to maintain critical DC microgrid operations like voltage regulation and load sharing under EU-FDI threats. The framework's practicality is validated through hardware-in-the-loop experiments, demonstrating its enhanced resilience and robust privacy protection against the complex challenges posed by quick variant FDI attacks.
Paper Structure (12 sections, 5 theorems, 32 equations, 7 figures)

This paper contains 12 sections, 5 theorems, 32 equations, 7 figures.

Table of Contents

  1. INTRODUCTION
  2. Standard Cooperative Secondary Control
  3. Attack-Resilient Privacy-Preserving Control
  4. Problem Formulation
  5. Attack-Resilient Privacy-Preserving Controller Design
  6. Main Results
  7. Hardware-in-the-Loop Validation
  8. Voltage Regulation and Current Sharing Test
  9. Resilient Controller in Liu 2023
  10. Robustness to Load Changes
  11. Communication Failure
  12. Conclusion

Key Result

Lemma 1

Given Assumption 1, $(\mathcal{L}+\mathcal{G})$ is nonsingular and positive-definite.

Figures (7)

  • Figure 1: The tested DC MG physical structure.
  • Figure 2: The tested DC MG physical structure built using Typhoon HIL devices.
  • Figure 3: Performance of the conventional control approach in the case of unbounded attack: Supplied currents (top), Terminal voltages of Converters (bottom).
  • Figure 4: Performance of the proposed attack-resilient control approach in the case of unbounded attack $\delta_i=\left[3~\mathrm{exp}\left(0.1t\right),4~\mathrm{exp}\left(0.2t\right),0.5~\mathrm{exp}\left(0.2t\right),0.1~\mathrm{exp}\left(0.3t\right)\right]^\mathrm{T},\forall i=1,2,3,4$: Supplied currents (top); Terminal voltages of Converters (bottom).
  • Figure 5: Performance of the proposed resilient control approach in liu2023resilient in the case of unbounded attack: Supplied currents (top); Terminal voltages of Converters (bottom).
  • ...and 2 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (15)

  • Lemma 1: fax2004information
  • Lemma 2: zuo2020distributed
  • Remark 1
  • Definition 1: Polynomially Unbounded Attack
  • Remark 2
  • Definition 2: EU-FDI Attack
  • Remark 3
  • Definition 3: khalil2002nonlinear
  • Definition 4: altafini2019dynamical
  • Remark 4
  • ...and 5 more