String commitment from unstructured noise
Jiawei Wu, Masahito Hayashi, Marco Tomamichel
TL;DR
This work addresses two-party string commitment under adversarial channels that may exhibit memory effects. It introduces the unstructured noisy channel (UsNC) model, formalizes a secure commitment protocol using linear codes and 2-universal hashing, and proves completeness, hiding, and binding with explicit finite-n bounds. An asymptotic rate is derived, showing how the rate depends on entropic bounds and channel parameters, and the model is instantiated by the noisy-quantum-storage (NQS) setting, linking physical limitations to the UsNC framework. Collectively, the results bridge two major approaches to commitment—noisy-channel based and physically constrained schemes—and demonstrate feasible commitment against stronger, non-i.i.d. adversaries, with practical relevance to quantum storage scenarios.
Abstract
Noisy channels are a foundational resource for constructing cryptographic primitives such as string commitment and oblivious transfer. The noisy channel model has been extended to unfair noisy channels, where adversaries can influence the parameters of a memoryless channel. In this work, we introduce the unstructured noisy channel model as a generalization of the unfair noisy channel model to allow the adversary to manipulate the channel arbitrarily subject to certain entropic constraints. We present a string commitment protocol with established security and derive its achievable commitment rate, demonstrating the feasibility of commitment against this stronger class of adversaries. Furthermore, we show that the entropic constraints in the unstructured noisy channel model can be derived from physical assumptions such as noisy quantum storage. Our work thus connects two distinct approaches to commitment, i.e., the noisy channel and physical limitations.
