Asymptotic Extinction in Large Coordination Games
Desmond Chan, Bart De Keijzer, Tobias Galla, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre
TL;DR
This work analyzes learning dynamics in large multi-player coordination games under Q-Learning, focusing on the emergence of Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE) and how exploration controls convergence. By employing a generating-functional (DMFT-like) framework, it derives an effective stochastic dynamics for the distribution of actions in the $N\to\infty$ limit and reveals a phase boundary at a critical exploration rate $T_{\text{crit}}$ that grows with both the number of players $p$ and payoff alignment $\Gamma$. A key finding is asymptotic extinction: for $\Gamma\ge 0$, a nonzero fraction of actions are played with vanishing probability as $N\to\infty$, while above $T_{\text{crit}}$ the dynamics converge to a unique fixed point; below this threshold, extinction is more pronounced and the fixed-point structure exhibits boundary behavior. The stability analysis yields a precise criterion, and in the large-$p$ limit the critical rate scales as $T_{\text{crit}} \approx (\hat{\Gamma}+1)\sqrt{e(p-1)}$ with $\hat{\Gamma}=\Gamma/(p-1)$, implying that identical-payoff coordination requires roughly twice the exploration of $p$-player zero-sum games. Collectively, the results illuminate how large action spaces and payoff alignment shape learning convergence and action-selection structure, informing exploration strategies in MARL for coordination tasks.
Abstract
We study the exploration-exploitation trade-off for large multiplayer coordination games where players strategise via Q-Learning, a common learning framework in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Q-Learning is known to have two shortcomings, namely non-convergence and potential equilibrium selection problems, when there are multiple fixed points, called Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE). Furthermore, whilst QRE have full support for finite games, it is not clear how Q-Learning behaves as the game becomes large. In this paper, we characterise the critical exploration rate that guarantees convergence to a unique fixed point, addressing the two shortcomings above. Using a generating-functional method, we show that this rate increases with the number of players and the alignment of their payoffs. For many-player coordination games with perfectly aligned payoffs, this exploration rate is roughly twice that of $p$-player zero-sum games. As for large games, we provide a structural result for QRE, which suggests that as the game size increases, Q-Learning converges to a QRE near the boundary of the simplex of the action space, a phenomenon we term asymptotic extinction, where a constant fraction of the actions are played with zero probability at a rate $o(1/N)$ for an $N$-action game.
