Connected Equitable Cake Division via Sperner's Lemma
Umang Bhaskar, A. R. Sricharan, Rohit Vaish
TL;DR
This paper investigates fair cake-cutting under the constraint that every agent receives a connected piece and all agents obtain the same utility (equitable division). It introduces the SANN (some agent nonnegative) valuation class, allowing global valuations with externalities and certain negatively valued additive cases, and proves the existence of a connected equitable allocation using Sperner's lemma via vanishing triangulations. The result extends known existence theorems to broader valuation families and connects to several natural subclasses of additive valuations (e.g., identical, split-cake, single-peaked), ensuring connected equitable allocations for appropriate agent orderings. The work also discusses the two-agent case with global valuations, and outlines computational and combinatorial questions, such as finding permutations that satisfy SANN and approximating equitable divisions, highlighting both theoretical and practical significance for fair division with connectivity constraints.
Abstract
We study the problem of fair cake-cutting where each agent receives a connected piece of the cake. A division of the cake is deemed fair if it is equitable, which means that all agents derive the same value from their assigned piece. Prior work has established the existence of a connected equitable division for agents with nonnegative valuations using various techniques. We provide a simple proof of this result using Sperner's lemma. Our proof extends known existence results for connected equitable divisions to significantly more general classes of valuations, including nonnegative valuations with externalities, as well as several interesting subclasses of general (possibly negative) valuations.
