Table of Contents
Fetching ...

The Complexity of Tullock Contests

Yu He, Fan Yao, Yang Yu, Xiaoyun Qiu, Minming Li, Haifeng Xu

TL;DR

This work analyzes the algorithmic complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in heterogeneous Tullock contests, revealing a sharp elasticity-driven boundary: when all players have small ($r_i\le1$) or large ($r_i>2$) elasticity, PNEs are computable in polynomial time; but if a polynomial number of players have medium elasticity ($1<r_i\le2$), determining PNE existence becomes NP-complete. To address the intractable case, the authors design a Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) that computes an $\epsilon$-PNE (and hence an $(L\epsilon)$-Nash equilibrium) when a PNE exists, with a provable runtime of $O(\frac{n^6}{\epsilon^2}\log^2 n)$. They implement these methods in a Python module and validate performance across settings, offering practical tools for equilibrium analysis in large-scale, heterogeneous contests such as blockchain mining. The results provide a principled bridge between equilibrium computation in asymmetric contests and computational complexity, highlighting how production elasticity shapes tractability and suggesting directions for efficient approximation in complex multi-agent settings.

Abstract

This paper studies the algorithmic complexity for computing the Nash equilibrium in the extensively studied Tullock Contest game. The (possibly heterogeneous) elasticity parameter $r_i$ determines whether a contestant $i$'s cost function is convex or concave. Our core conceptual insight is that the domains of $r_i$ governs the complexity for solving Tullock contents. This is illustrated by our following complete set of algorithmic results. - When at most $O(\log n)$ number of contestants have $r_i \in (1,2]$, we show polynomial-time algorithms to determine the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), and compute a PNE whenever it exists. Notably, this result is proved under three different regimes, each via quite different techniques: (1) all $r_i \leq 1$, (2) all $r_i > 2$, and (3) a mixed situation with at most $O(\log n)$ number of $r_i \in (1, 2]$. - When polynomially many contestants have $r_i \in (1,2]$, we prove that determining the existence of a PNE is NP-complete. In response to this hardness result, we design a Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) that finds an $ε$-PNE when an exact PNE exists.

The Complexity of Tullock Contests

TL;DR

This work analyzes the algorithmic complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in heterogeneous Tullock contests, revealing a sharp elasticity-driven boundary: when all players have small () or large () elasticity, PNEs are computable in polynomial time; but if a polynomial number of players have medium elasticity (), determining PNE existence becomes NP-complete. To address the intractable case, the authors design a Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) that computes an -PNE (and hence an -Nash equilibrium) when a PNE exists, with a provable runtime of . They implement these methods in a Python module and validate performance across settings, offering practical tools for equilibrium analysis in large-scale, heterogeneous contests such as blockchain mining. The results provide a principled bridge between equilibrium computation in asymmetric contests and computational complexity, highlighting how production elasticity shapes tractability and suggesting directions for efficient approximation in complex multi-agent settings.

Abstract

This paper studies the algorithmic complexity for computing the Nash equilibrium in the extensively studied Tullock Contest game. The (possibly heterogeneous) elasticity parameter determines whether a contestant 's cost function is convex or concave. Our core conceptual insight is that the domains of governs the complexity for solving Tullock contents. This is illustrated by our following complete set of algorithmic results. - When at most number of contestants have , we show polynomial-time algorithms to determine the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), and compute a PNE whenever it exists. Notably, this result is proved under three different regimes, each via quite different techniques: (1) all , (2) all , and (3) a mixed situation with at most number of . - When polynomially many contestants have , we prove that determining the existence of a PNE is NP-complete. In response to this hardness result, we design a Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) that finds an -PNE when an exact PNE exists.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 58 sections, 13 theorems, 51 equations, 3 figures, 7 algorithms.

Key Result

Proposition 1

Given the first-order condition $b(A, \sigma_i; a_i,r_i)$ mentioned above, for any agent $i$:

Figures (3)

  • Figure 1: Optimal action share as a function of aggregate production
  • Figure 2: Best Response Action Share as a Function of Aggregate Production when $r_i = 1$.
  • Figure :

Theorems & Definitions (20)

  • Definition 1: Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
  • Definition 2: Small/Medium/Large Elasticity
  • Definition 3: Action Share
  • Definition 4: PNE in Terms of Aggregate Action and Action Shares
  • Proposition 1
  • Proposition 2
  • Proposition 3
  • Corollary 1
  • Theorem 1
  • Theorem 2
  • ...and 10 more