Traversing the Subspace of Adversarial Patches
Jens Bayer, Stefan Becker, David Münch, Michael Arens, Jürgen Beyerer
TL;DR
This work investigates whether adversarial patches for object detectors lie on a low-dimensional manifold, as suggested by the manifold hypothesis. It analyzes a crafted set of patches with three dimensionality-reduction methods (PCA via Eigenpatches, convolutional autoencoders, and CVAEs), evaluating patch reconstruction quality and attack impact on a YOLOv7 tiny detector across INRIA and Crowdhuman datasets. The study finds that sophisticated nonlinear methods do not outperform PCA, and sampling patches from simple low-dimensional representations suffices for both attack execution and adversarial training effectiveness. Overall, the results support the manifold view of adversarial patches and indicate that PCA-based sampling provides a practical baseline for defense-oriented evaluations, with future work exploring additional manifold techniques and defenses.
Abstract
Despite ongoing research on the topic of adversarial examples in deep learning for computer vision, some fundamentals of the nature of these attacks remain unclear. As the manifold hypothesis posits, high-dimensional data tends to be part of a low-dimensional manifold. To verify the thesis with adversarial patches, this paper provides an analysis of a set of adversarial patches and investigates the reconstruction abilities of three different dimensionality reduction methods. Quantitatively, the performance of reconstructed patches in an attack setting is measured and the impact of sampled patches from the latent space during adversarial training is investigated. The evaluation is performed on two publicly available datasets for person detection. The results indicate that more sophisticated dimensionality reduction methods offer no advantages over a simple principal component analysis.
