Vagueness and the Connectives
Wesley H. Holliday
TL;DR
This paper investigates which non-classical base logic best accommodates two sources of non-classicality in natural language: epistemic modals and vagueness. It surveys candidate logics—orthologic, fundamental logic, and compatibility logic—and develops relational fixpoint semantics to test their behavior on Sorites-style arguments. By constructing symmetric and pseudosymmetric Sorites models, the author shows orthologic can render Sorites consistent via non-distributivity, while fundamental logic preserves genuine expressive power through excluded middle in a targeted way, suggesting it as a natural weaker base than orthologic for combining vagueness with modality. The work clarifies the trade-offs between distributivity, double negation, and excluded middle, and highlights a path for future comparison with other vagueness theories such as supervaluationism and epistemicism.
Abstract
Challenges to classical logic have emerged from several sources. According to recent work, the behavior of epistemic modals in natural language motivates weakening classical logic to orthologic, a logic originally discovered by Birkhoff and von Neumann in the study of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we consider a different tradition of thinking that the behavior of vague predicates in natural language motivates weakening classical logic to intuitionistic logic or even giving up some intuitionistic principles. We focus in particular on Fine's recent approach to vagueness. Our main question is: what is a natural non-classical base logic to which to retreat in light of both the non-classicality emerging from epistemic modals and the non-classicality emerging from vagueness? We first consider whether orthologic itself might be the answer. We then discuss whether accommodating the non-classicality emerging from epistemic modals and vagueness might point in the direction of a weaker system of fundamental logic.
