Practitioner Paper: Decoding Intellectual Property: Acoustic and Magnetic Side-channel Attack on a 3D Printer

TL;DR

This work demonstrates the feasibility of reconstructing G-codes by performing side-channel attacks on a 3D printer using a smartphone from greater distances, and predicts results for each axial movement, stepper, nozzle, and rotor speed achieve high accuracy.

Abstract

The widespread accessibility and ease of use of additive manufacturing (AM), widely recognized as 3D printing, has put Intellectual Property (IP) at great risk of theft. As 3D printers emit acoustic and magnetic signals while printing, the signals can be captured and analyzed using a smartphone for the purpose of IP attack. This is an instance of physical-to-cyber exploitation, as there is no direct contact with the 3D printer. Although cyber vulnerabilities in 3D printers are becoming more apparent, the methods for protecting IPs are yet to be fully investigated. The threat scenarios in previous works have mainly rested on advanced recording devices for data collection and entailed placing the device very close to the 3D printer. However, our work demonstrates the feasibility of reconstructing G-codes by performing side-channel attacks on a 3D printer using a smartphone from greater distances. By training models using Gradient Boosted Decision Trees, our prediction results for each axial movement, stepper, nozzle, and rotor speed achieve high accuracy, with a mean of 98.80%, without any intrusiveness. We effectively deploy the model in a real-world examination, achieving a Mean Tendency Error (MTE) of 4.47% on a plain G-code design.

Figures (14)

• Figure 1: Lifecycle of AMs under physical attack
• Figure 2: Specific G-code commands for only moving the nozzle on the x-axis
• Figure 3: LULZBOT TAZ 3D printer with a heating nozzle and platform.
• Figure 4: Threat model
• Figure 5: Gain vs. time for x-axis movements