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SDN-Based Smart Cyber Switching (SCS) for Cyber Restoration of a Digital Substation

Mansi Girdhar, Kuchan Park, Wencong Su, Junho Hong, Akila Herath, Chen-Ching Liu

TL;DR

A cybersecurity framework that leverages software-defined networking (SDN) to bolster the resilience of substations based on the IEC-61850 standard is proposed, demonstrating its ability to sustain substation operations during cyber-attacks and significantly improve the overall resilience of the power grid.

Abstract

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have increasingly been targets of cyber-attacks, causing widespread and extended blackouts. Digital substations are particularly vulnerable to such cyber incursions, jeopardizing grid stability. This paper addresses these risks by proposing a cybersecurity framework that leverages software-defined networking (SDN) to bolster the resilience of substations based on the IEC-61850 standard. The research introduces a strategy involving smart cyber switching (SCS) for mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for restoration, ensuring ongoing operational integrity and cybersecurity within a substation. The SCS framework improves the physical network's behavior (i.e., leveraging commercial SDN capabilities) by incorporating an adaptive port controller (APC) module for dynamic port management and an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect and counteract malicious IEC-61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages within the substation's communication network. The framework's effectiveness is validated through comprehensive simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, demonstrating its ability to sustain substation operations during cyber-attacks and significantly improve the overall resilience of the power grid.

SDN-Based Smart Cyber Switching (SCS) for Cyber Restoration of a Digital Substation

TL;DR

A cybersecurity framework that leverages software-defined networking (SDN) to bolster the resilience of substations based on the IEC-61850 standard is proposed, demonstrating its ability to sustain substation operations during cyber-attacks and significantly improve the overall resilience of the power grid.

Abstract

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have increasingly been targets of cyber-attacks, causing widespread and extended blackouts. Digital substations are particularly vulnerable to such cyber incursions, jeopardizing grid stability. This paper addresses these risks by proposing a cybersecurity framework that leverages software-defined networking (SDN) to bolster the resilience of substations based on the IEC-61850 standard. The research introduces a strategy involving smart cyber switching (SCS) for mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for restoration, ensuring ongoing operational integrity and cybersecurity within a substation. The SCS framework improves the physical network's behavior (i.e., leveraging commercial SDN capabilities) by incorporating an adaptive port controller (APC) module for dynamic port management and an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect and counteract malicious IEC-61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages within the substation's communication network. The framework's effectiveness is validated through comprehensive simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, demonstrating its ability to sustain substation operations during cyber-attacks and significantly improve the overall resilience of the power grid.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 12 sections, 7 equations, 5 figures.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Hardware-In-The-Loop (HIL) Testbed
  3. Proposed Smart Cyber Switching (SCS) Framework
  4. Proactive Substation Security Algorithm (PSSA)
  5. Simulation and Validation
  6. Cyber-Attack Scenarios
  7. SV Attack Scenario
  8. Simulation Setup and Results
  9. GOOSE Attack Scenario
  10. Simulation Setup and Results
  11. Conclusion and Future Work
  12. Acknowledgment

Figures (5)

  • Figure 1: HIL testbed configuration for evaluating substation cybersecurity.
  • Figure 2: Proposed smart cyber switching (SCS)-based mitigation using adaptive port controller (APC) and restoration using concurrent IED (CIED).
  • Figure 3: SCS network initialization and configuration log with real-time SV and GOOSE cyber-attacks detection and response.
  • Figure 4: Transition of protection functions of overcurrent PIED and differential PIED to CIED on the occurrence of cyber-attacks.
  • Figure 5: GOOSE packets from CIED that performs the protection functions of overcurrent and differential PIEDs when cyber-attacks occur on the digital substation.