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The impact of mobility, beam sweeping and smart jammers on security vulnerabilities of 5G cells

Ghazal Asemian, Michel Kulhandjian, Mohammadreza Amini, Burak Kantarci, Claude D'Amours, Melike Erol-Kantarci

TL;DR

This paper addresses the security vulnerabilities of 5G NR under jamming in mobility-rich scenarios, notably with connected-vehicle-like UEs modeled by the STEPS mobility framework. It employs end-to-end, link-level simulations in a dynamic multi-UE/multi-gNB 5G network to analyze throughput, goodput, and the vulnerability of synchronization signal blocks (SSB) under barrage and smart jamming, including targeted PSS/SSS and PBCH attacks. Key contributions include quantifying the multi-jammer impact on cell metrics, revealing that PDSCH is more vulnerable than PSS/SSS at the same power, illustrating the energy efficiency advantage of smart jammers targeting SSB or PBCH, and demonstrating that beam sweeping can significantly mitigate smart-jammer effects. The findings have practical implications for designing jamming detection and mitigation strategies in 5G deployments, particularly in mobility-enabled and mission-critical scenarios where rapid restoration of service is crucial.

Abstract

The vulnerability of 5G networks to jamming attacks has emerged as a significant concern. This paper contributes in two primary aspects. Firstly, it investigates the effect of a multi-jammer on 5G cell metrics, specifically throughput and goodput. The investigation is conducted within the context of a mobility model for user equipment (UE), with a focus on scenarios involving connected vehicles (CVs) engaged in a mission. Secondly, the vulnerability of synchronization signal block (SSB) components is examined concerning jamming power and beam sweeping. Notably, the study reveals that increasing jamming power beyond 40 dBm in our specific scenario configuration no longer decreases network throughput due to the re-transmission of packets through the hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) process. Furthermore, it is observed that under the same jamming power, the physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH) is more vulnerable than the primary synchronization signal (PSS) and secondary synchronization signal (SSS). However, a smart jammer can disrupt the cell search process by injecting less power and targeting PSS-SSS or physical broadcast channel (PBCH) data compared to a barrage jammer. On the other hand, beam sweeping proves effective in mitigating the impact of a smart jammer, reducing the error vector magnitude root mean square from 51.59% to 23.36% under the same jamming power.

The impact of mobility, beam sweeping and smart jammers on security vulnerabilities of 5G cells

TL;DR

This paper addresses the security vulnerabilities of 5G NR under jamming in mobility-rich scenarios, notably with connected-vehicle-like UEs modeled by the STEPS mobility framework. It employs end-to-end, link-level simulations in a dynamic multi-UE/multi-gNB 5G network to analyze throughput, goodput, and the vulnerability of synchronization signal blocks (SSB) under barrage and smart jamming, including targeted PSS/SSS and PBCH attacks. Key contributions include quantifying the multi-jammer impact on cell metrics, revealing that PDSCH is more vulnerable than PSS/SSS at the same power, illustrating the energy efficiency advantage of smart jammers targeting SSB or PBCH, and demonstrating that beam sweeping can significantly mitigate smart-jammer effects. The findings have practical implications for designing jamming detection and mitigation strategies in 5G deployments, particularly in mobility-enabled and mission-critical scenarios where rapid restoration of service is crucial.

Abstract

The vulnerability of 5G networks to jamming attacks has emerged as a significant concern. This paper contributes in two primary aspects. Firstly, it investigates the effect of a multi-jammer on 5G cell metrics, specifically throughput and goodput. The investigation is conducted within the context of a mobility model for user equipment (UE), with a focus on scenarios involving connected vehicles (CVs) engaged in a mission. Secondly, the vulnerability of synchronization signal block (SSB) components is examined concerning jamming power and beam sweeping. Notably, the study reveals that increasing jamming power beyond 40 dBm in our specific scenario configuration no longer decreases network throughput due to the re-transmission of packets through the hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) process. Furthermore, it is observed that under the same jamming power, the physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH) is more vulnerable than the primary synchronization signal (PSS) and secondary synchronization signal (SSS). However, a smart jammer can disrupt the cell search process by injecting less power and targeting PSS-SSS or physical broadcast channel (PBCH) data compared to a barrage jammer. On the other hand, beam sweeping proves effective in mitigating the impact of a smart jammer, reducing the error vector magnitude root mean square from 51.59% to 23.36% under the same jamming power.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 11 sections, 6 equations, 11 figures, 2 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Related Work
  3. System Model
  4. 5G Network Model
  5. Mobility Model
  6. Channel Model
  7. Jammer Model
  8. Performance analysis of mobility, jammer position, and targeted reference signals
  9. Cell Network Metrics Under Jamming
  10. SSB Vulnerability To Jamming
  11. Conclusion

Figures (11)

  • Figure 1: Cell throughput and goodput vs. number of jammers with jammer distance of $224 \: m$ at jamming power of $20$ dBm.
  • Figure 2: Cell throughput and goodput versus transmit power of the jammer and jammer-gNB distance.
  • Figure 3: Equalized PDSCH constellation - $P_j=30\,dBm$
  • Figure 4: PSS correlation with whole RG under jamming attack- $P^t_j=30\,dBm$
  • Figure 5: PSS correlation with whole RG under jamming attack- $P^t_j=30\,dBm$
  • ...and 6 more figures