Logo
ScienceStack
Table of Contents
Fetching ...
Sign In

The museum pass problem with consortia

Juan Carlos Gonçalves-Dosantos, Ricardo Martínez, Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano

Abstract

In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. All these mechanisms satisfy different reasonable properties related to fairness and stability which serve to axiomatically characterize them.

The museum pass problem with consortia

Abstract

In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. All these mechanisms satisfy different reasonable properties related to fairness and stability which serve to axiomatically characterize them.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 6 sections, 10 theorems, 37 equations.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. The consortia model
  3. Revenue allocation mechanisms
  4. Normative framework: Axioms
  5. Axiomatic characterization of the rules
  6. Final remarks

Key Result

Theorem 1

A rule satisfies symmetry within consortia, symmetry between consortia, dummy, and composition if and only if it is the egalitarian-egalitarian rule.

Theorems & Definitions (25)

  • Example 1
  • Theorem 1
  • proof
  • Remark 1
  • Theorem 2
  • proof
  • Remark 2
  • Theorem 3
  • proof
  • Remark 3
  • ...and 15 more