(Quantum) Indifferentiability and Pre-Computation
Joseph Carolan, Alexander Poremba, Mark Zhandry
TL;DR
This work shows that indifferentiability is (generically) insufficient for capturing pre-computation and proposes a strengthening of indifferentiability which is not only composable but also takes arbitrary pre-computation into account, and yields the first classical/quantum space-time trade-off for one-round sponge inversion.
Abstract
Indifferentiability is a popular cryptographic paradigm for analyzing the security of ideal objects -- both in a classical as well as in a quantum world. It is typically stated in the form of a composable and simulation-based definition, and captures what it means for a construction (e.g., a cryptographic hash function) to be ``as good as'' an ideal object (e.g., a random oracle). Despite its strength, indifferentiability is not known to offer security against pre-processing attacks in which the adversary gains access to (classical or quantum) advice that is relevant to the particular construction. In this work, we show that indifferentiability is (generically) insufficient for capturing pre-computation. To accommodate this shortcoming, we propose a strengthening of indifferentiability which is not only composable but also takes arbitrary pre-computation into account. As an application, we show that the one-round sponge is indifferentiable (with pre-computation) from a random oracle. This yields the first (and tight) classical/quantum space-time trade-off for one-round sponge inversion.
