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EF1 for Mixed Manna with Unequal Entitlements

Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma

Abstract

We study fair division of indivisible mixed manna when agents have unequal entitlements, with weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1) as our primary notion of fairness. We identify several shortcomings of existing techniques to achieve WEF1. Hence, we relax WEF1 to weighted envy-freeness up to 1 transfer (WEF1T), and give a polynomial-time algorithm for achieving it. We also generalize Fisher markets to the mixed manna setting, and use them to get a polynomial-time algorithm for two agents that outputs a WEF1 allocation.

EF1 for Mixed Manna with Unequal Entitlements

Abstract

We study fair division of indivisible mixed manna when agents have unequal entitlements, with weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1) as our primary notion of fairness. We identify several shortcomings of existing techniques to achieve WEF1. Hence, we relax WEF1 to weighted envy-freeness up to 1 transfer (WEF1T), and give a polynomial-time algorithm for achieving it. We also generalize Fisher markets to the mixed manna setting, and use them to get a polynomial-time algorithm for two agents that outputs a WEF1 allocation.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 15 sections, 13 theorems, 10 equations, 2 tables, 1 algorithm.

Key Result

Theorem 1

Let $([n], G \cup C, (v_i)_{i=1}^n, w)$ be a fair division instance, where $G$ is the set of goods and neutral items, and $C$ is the set of chores. Let $A^{(G)}$ be a WEF1 allocation of $G$ and $A^{(C)}$ be a WEF1 allocation of $C$. Then allocation $A$ is WEF1T, where $A_i := A^{(G)}_i \cup A^{(C)}_

Theorems & Definitions (34)

  • Definition 1
  • Definition 2: PO and fPO
  • Theorem 1
  • proof
  • Definition 3
  • Theorem 2
  • proof
  • Example 4
  • Example 5
  • Definition 6: market equilibrium
  • ...and 24 more