Exploring Power Side-Channel Challenges in Embedded Systems Security

TL;DR

A novel signal-processing method is introduced that addresses key limitations, enabling effective PSC attacks in real-world embedded systems without requiring hardware modifications and verifying its potential to expand its usage in various embedded systems security applications beyond traditional cryptographic applications.

Abstract

Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in the embedded systems domain faces significant challenges. These include the need for specialized hardware setups to manage high noise levels in real-world targets and assumptions regarding the attacker's knowledge and capabilities. This paper systematically analyzes these challenges and introduces a novel signal-processing method that addresses key limitations, enabling effective PSC attacks in real-world embedded systems without requiring hardware modifications. We validate the proposed approach through experiments on real-world black-box embedded devices, verifying its potential to expand its usage in various embedded systems security applications beyond traditional cryptographic applications.

Figures (16)

• Figure 1: Frequency domain representation shows a better view of the signal that can help distinguish power leakage originating from different sources of the target board.
• Figure 2: Peripheral interaction's effect in power trace
• Figure 3: Software Noise vs Hardware Noise
• Figure 4: The fingerprint for AES128 in the presence of peripheral peaks, with ten rounds highlighted.
• Figure 5: CFG fingerprinting for an ini parser. All inputs have the same execution time with different fingerprints.