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Securing UAV Communication: Authentication and Integrity

Meriem Ouadah, Fatiha Merazka

TL;DR

Secure inter-UAV communication over insecure channels is essential to prevent MITM and data tampering. The paper proposes a lightweight authentication scheme that combines Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange and HMAC within ROS-based UAV communications, reporting acceptable latency for DH keys up to $2048$ bits and detecting tampering by both drones, while $4096$-bit keys slow dramatically. The related work surveys existing UAV security approaches and positions DH+HMAC as a simple, autonomous alternative suitable for resource-constrained UAVs within ROS-based architectures. The study demonstrates a ROS/Gazebo PX4/MAVROS implementation where inter-UAV keys are exchanged, followed by HMAC-tagged messages, with time-based evaluations and MITM tampering tests showing reliable detection, informing future work on scalability and energy efficiency for 6G-enabled UAV networks.

Abstract

Recent technological advancements have seen the integration of unmanned aerial networks (UAVs) into various sectors, from civilian missions to military operations. In this context, ensuring security, precisely authentication, is essential to prevent data theft and manipulation. A Man-in-the-Middle attack not only compromises network integrity but also threatens the original data, potentially leading to theft or alteration. In this work, we proposed an authentication method to secure UAV data exchange over an insecure communication channel. Our solution combines Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange and Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) within ROS communication channels to authenticate exchanged UAV data. We evaluated our method by measuring transmission time and simulating key tampering, finding acceptable performance for DH key sizes below 4096 bits but longer times for larger sizes due to increased complexity. Both drones successfully detected tampered keys, affirming our method's efficacy in protecting UAV communication. However, scalability challenges in resource-constrained environments warrant further research.

Securing UAV Communication: Authentication and Integrity

TL;DR

Secure inter-UAV communication over insecure channels is essential to prevent MITM and data tampering. The paper proposes a lightweight authentication scheme that combines Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange and HMAC within ROS-based UAV communications, reporting acceptable latency for DH keys up to bits and detecting tampering by both drones, while -bit keys slow dramatically. The related work surveys existing UAV security approaches and positions DH+HMAC as a simple, autonomous alternative suitable for resource-constrained UAVs within ROS-based architectures. The study demonstrates a ROS/Gazebo PX4/MAVROS implementation where inter-UAV keys are exchanged, followed by HMAC-tagged messages, with time-based evaluations and MITM tampering tests showing reliable detection, informing future work on scalability and energy efficiency for 6G-enabled UAV networks.

Abstract

Recent technological advancements have seen the integration of unmanned aerial networks (UAVs) into various sectors, from civilian missions to military operations. In this context, ensuring security, precisely authentication, is essential to prevent data theft and manipulation. A Man-in-the-Middle attack not only compromises network integrity but also threatens the original data, potentially leading to theft or alteration. In this work, we proposed an authentication method to secure UAV data exchange over an insecure communication channel. Our solution combines Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange and Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) within ROS communication channels to authenticate exchanged UAV data. We evaluated our method by measuring transmission time and simulating key tampering, finding acceptable performance for DH key sizes below 4096 bits but longer times for larger sizes due to increased complexity. Both drones successfully detected tampered keys, affirming our method's efficacy in protecting UAV communication. However, scalability challenges in resource-constrained environments warrant further research.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 10 sections, 2 equations, 9 figures.

Figures (9)

  • Figure 1: Man in the middle attack in an Inter-UAV communication scenario.
  • Figure 2: Diffie-Hellman & HMAC algorithms function.
  • Figure 3: 3D Simulation of UAVs over Gazebo interfacing with ROS.
  • Figure 4: System Architecture.
  • Figure 5: Sequence diagram explaining the chosen algorithm.
  • ...and 4 more figures