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Eco-driving Incentive Mechanisms for Mitigating Emissions in Urban Transportation

M. Umar B. Niazi, Jung-Hoon Cho, Munther A. Dahleh, Roy Dong, Cathy Wu

Abstract

This paper develops incentive mechanisms for promoting eco-driving with the overarching goal of minimizing emissions in transportation networks. The system operator provides drivers with energy-efficient driving guidance throughout their trips and measures compliance through vehicle telematics that capture how closely drivers follow this guidance. Drivers optimize their behaviors based on personal trade-offs between travel times and emissions. To design effective incentives, the operator elicits driver preferences regarding trip urgency and willingness to eco-drive, while determining optimal budget allocations and eco-driving recommendations. Two distinct settings based on driver behavior are analyzed. When drivers report their preferences truthfully, an incentive mechanism ensuring obedience (drivers find it optimal to follow recommendations) is designed by implementing eco-driving recommendations as a Nash equilibrium. When drivers may report strategically, the mechanism is extended to be both obedient and truthful (drivers find it optimal to report truthfully). Unlike existing works that focus on congestion or routing decisions in transportation networks, our framework explicitly targets emissions reduction by incentivizing drivers. The proposed mechanism addresses both strategic behavior and network effects arising from driver interactions, without requiring the operator to reveal system parameters to the drivers. Numerical simulations demonstrate the effects of budget constraints, driver types, and strategic misreporting on equilibrium outcomes and emissions reduction.

Eco-driving Incentive Mechanisms for Mitigating Emissions in Urban Transportation

Abstract

This paper develops incentive mechanisms for promoting eco-driving with the overarching goal of minimizing emissions in transportation networks. The system operator provides drivers with energy-efficient driving guidance throughout their trips and measures compliance through vehicle telematics that capture how closely drivers follow this guidance. Drivers optimize their behaviors based on personal trade-offs between travel times and emissions. To design effective incentives, the operator elicits driver preferences regarding trip urgency and willingness to eco-drive, while determining optimal budget allocations and eco-driving recommendations. Two distinct settings based on driver behavior are analyzed. When drivers report their preferences truthfully, an incentive mechanism ensuring obedience (drivers find it optimal to follow recommendations) is designed by implementing eco-driving recommendations as a Nash equilibrium. When drivers may report strategically, the mechanism is extended to be both obedient and truthful (drivers find it optimal to report truthfully). Unlike existing works that focus on congestion or routing decisions in transportation networks, our framework explicitly targets emissions reduction by incentivizing drivers. The proposed mechanism addresses both strategic behavior and network effects arising from driver interactions, without requiring the operator to reveal system parameters to the drivers. Numerical simulations demonstrate the effects of budget constraints, driver types, and strategic misreporting on equilibrium outcomes and emissions reduction.

Paper Structure

This paper contains 21 sections, 6 theorems, 29 equations, 4 figures.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Related Work
  3. Model of Eco-Driving Incentive Mechanism
  4. Eco-driving Policy and Interactions
  5. Emissions and Travel Time
  6. Decision Model of Drivers
  7. Eco-driving Game induced by EDIM
  8. Obedience
  9. First-best Eco-driving Incentive Mechanism
  10. Obedience under Nash Equilibrium
  11. Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
  12. Equivalent Formulation
  13. Second-best Eco-driving Incentive Mechanism
  14. Truthfulness
  15. Implementation
  16. ...and 6 more sections

Key Result

Lemma 1

Let assume:convex-diff hold. Then, the eco-driving game $(\ell_1,\dots,\ell_n)$ admits a Nash equilibrium.

Figures (4)

  • Figure 1: Interactions between the TSO and the drivers in an EDIM, and among the drivers when they eco-drive.
  • Figure 2: Recommended and optimal eco-driving levels as functions of the reported type $\hat{\theta}_i$.
  • Figure 3: Incentivized cost $\ell_i(a_i,f_{-i}(\hat{\theta}_i,\theta_{-i}),\theta_i,u_i(\hat{\theta}_i,\theta_{-i}))$ as a function of eco-driving level $a_i$ and reported type $\hat{\theta}_i$.
  • Figure 4: Emissions of drivers as a function of the budget.

Theorems & Definitions (16)

  • Remark 1
  • Remark 2
  • Remark 3
  • Remark 4
  • Definition 1
  • Lemma 1
  • Definition 2
  • Proposition 1
  • Lemma 2
  • Remark 5
  • ...and 6 more