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The Cyber Alliance Game: How Alliances Influence Cyber-Warfare

Gergely Benkő, Gergely Biczók

TL;DR

The paper investigates how alliances shape cyber-warfare decisions by formulating the Cyber Alliance Game (CAG) and extending it with intra-alliance power structures and policy postures. It analyzes how the choice between exploiting a vulnerability or sharing it depends on discovery probability $p$, attack willingness $q$, and alliance reward $R_i$, and demonstrates that alliance rewards can promote peaceful sharing. It further shows that internal power dynamics (Dictator/Veto/Dummy) and alliance posture (defensive vs offensive) significantly influence equilibrium outcomes, providing a framework to interpret real-world alliance behavior in cyber-conflicts. The work highlights practical implications for designing alliance incentives and policies to steer member states toward cooperative defense or coordinated offense, while acknowledging limitations and outlining avenues for future, more dynamic models.

Abstract

Cyber-warfare has become the norm in current ongoing military conflicts. Over the past decade, numerous examples have shown the extent to which nation-states become vulnerable if they do not focus on building their cyber capacities. Adding to the inherent complexity of cyberwar scenarios, a state is usually a member of one or more alliances. Alliance policies and internal struggles could shape the individual actions of member states; intuitively, this also holds for the cyber domain. In this paper, we define and study a simple Cyber Alliance Game with the objective of understanding the fundamental influence of alliances on cyber conflicts between nation-states. Specifically, we focus on the decision of whether to exploit a newly found vulnerability individually or share it with the alliance. First, we characterize the impact of vulnerability-sharing rewards on the resulting equilibrium. Second, we study the implications of the internal power structure of alliances on cyberwar outcomes and infer the expected behavior of Dictator, Veto, and Dummy players. Finally, we investigate how alliances can nudge their members via rewards and punishments to adhere to their defensive or offensive cyber policy. We believe that our results contribute to the fundamental understanding of real-world cyber-conflicts by characterizing the impact of alliances.

The Cyber Alliance Game: How Alliances Influence Cyber-Warfare

TL;DR

The paper investigates how alliances shape cyber-warfare decisions by formulating the Cyber Alliance Game (CAG) and extending it with intra-alliance power structures and policy postures. It analyzes how the choice between exploiting a vulnerability or sharing it depends on discovery probability , attack willingness , and alliance reward , and demonstrates that alliance rewards can promote peaceful sharing. It further shows that internal power dynamics (Dictator/Veto/Dummy) and alliance posture (defensive vs offensive) significantly influence equilibrium outcomes, providing a framework to interpret real-world alliance behavior in cyber-conflicts. The work highlights practical implications for designing alliance incentives and policies to steer member states toward cooperative defense or coordinated offense, while acknowledging limitations and outlining avenues for future, more dynamic models.

Abstract

Cyber-warfare has become the norm in current ongoing military conflicts. Over the past decade, numerous examples have shown the extent to which nation-states become vulnerable if they do not focus on building their cyber capacities. Adding to the inherent complexity of cyberwar scenarios, a state is usually a member of one or more alliances. Alliance policies and internal struggles could shape the individual actions of member states; intuitively, this also holds for the cyber domain. In this paper, we define and study a simple Cyber Alliance Game with the objective of understanding the fundamental influence of alliances on cyber conflicts between nation-states. Specifically, we focus on the decision of whether to exploit a newly found vulnerability individually or share it with the alliance. First, we characterize the impact of vulnerability-sharing rewards on the resulting equilibrium. Second, we study the implications of the internal power structure of alliances on cyberwar outcomes and infer the expected behavior of Dictator, Veto, and Dummy players. Finally, we investigate how alliances can nudge their members via rewards and punishments to adhere to their defensive or offensive cyber policy. We believe that our results contribute to the fundamental understanding of real-world cyber-conflicts by characterizing the impact of alliances.
Paper Structure (23 sections, 2 equations, 8 figures, 1 table)

This paper contains 23 sections, 2 equations, 8 figures, 1 table.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Background
  3. Terminology
  4. Game theoretical models of cyber-warfare
  5. Weighted voting
  6. The Cyber Alliance Game
  7. Strategies and game mechanics
  8. Game parameters
  9. Payoffs
  10. Equilibrium analysis
  11. The Cyber Alliance Game with Power Structure
  12. Parameters
  13. Equilibrium analysis
  14. Incorporating alliance policy
  15. Alliance posture
  16. ...and 8 more sections

Figures (8)

  • Figure 1: Cyber Alliance Game in extensive form
  • Figure 2: Left: $R_1$=0.1, $R_2$=0.1; Mid: $R_1$=0.75, $R_2$=0.75; Right: $R_1$=0.25, $R_2$=0.75
  • Figure 3: Left: Veto vs. Veto, $R_1$=$R_2$=0.9; Mid: Dict. vs. Veto, $R_1$=$R_2$=0.5; Right: Veto vs. Dummy, $R_1$=0.9, $R_2$=0.5.
  • Figure 4: Left: Dict. vs. Dict., $R_1$=0.9, $R_2$=0.2; Right: Dict. vs. Dummy, $R_1$=0.55, $R_2$=0.4
  • Figure 5: Cyber Alliance Game with both power and policy structure in extensive form
  • ...and 3 more figures