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Transient-Safe and Attack-Resilient Secondary Control in AC Microgrids Under Polynomially Unbounded FDI Attacks

Mohamadamin Rajabinezhad, Nesa Shams, Yichao Wang, Shan Zuo

TL;DR

This work tackles the challenge of maintaining transient safety in islanded AC microgrids under polynomially unbounded false data injection attacks on control inputs. It introduces fully distributed resilient secondary controllers that integrate control barrier functions (CBFs) for safety and adaptive compensatory signals to counteract attacks, with a Lyapunov-based proof of uniformly ultimately bounded ($UUB$) convergence for frequency, voltage, and power sharing. The design yields safe transient trajectories even when attacks drive inputs with unbounded higher-order derivatives, and the ultimate bounds shrink with larger adaptation gains, allowing arbitrarily tight safety. Validation on a modified IEEE 34-bus inverter-based microgrid demonstrates improved resilience, safety, and reliability under adverse cyber-physical conditions, with Case II showing sustained operation within predefined safety regions.

Abstract

This letter proposes a novel, fully distributed, transient-safe resilient secondary control strategies for AC microgrids, addressing unbounded false data injection (FDI) attacks on control input channels. Unlike existing methods that focus primarily on steady-state convergence, our approach guarantees transient safety, ensuring that system states remain within predefined safety bounds even during attack initiation a critical aspect overlooked in prior research. Given the reduction of network inertia by increasing the penetration of inverted-based renewables, large overshooting and intense fluctuations are more likely to occur during transients caused by disturbances and cyber-attacks. To mitigate these risks, the proposed control method enhances defense capabilities against polynomially unbounded FDI attacks, maintaining safe system trajectories for both frequency and voltage throughout the transient response. Through rigorous Lyapunov-based stability analysis, we formally certify the strategies to achieve uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) convergence in frequency and voltage regulation, and active power sharing across multi-inverter-based AC microgrids. Numerical simulation studies verify the effectiveness of the proposed control protocols, demonstrating improved system reliability, safety and resilience under adverse conditions.

Transient-Safe and Attack-Resilient Secondary Control in AC Microgrids Under Polynomially Unbounded FDI Attacks

TL;DR

This work tackles the challenge of maintaining transient safety in islanded AC microgrids under polynomially unbounded false data injection attacks on control inputs. It introduces fully distributed resilient secondary controllers that integrate control barrier functions (CBFs) for safety and adaptive compensatory signals to counteract attacks, with a Lyapunov-based proof of uniformly ultimately bounded () convergence for frequency, voltage, and power sharing. The design yields safe transient trajectories even when attacks drive inputs with unbounded higher-order derivatives, and the ultimate bounds shrink with larger adaptation gains, allowing arbitrarily tight safety. Validation on a modified IEEE 34-bus inverter-based microgrid demonstrates improved resilience, safety, and reliability under adverse cyber-physical conditions, with Case II showing sustained operation within predefined safety regions.

Abstract

This letter proposes a novel, fully distributed, transient-safe resilient secondary control strategies for AC microgrids, addressing unbounded false data injection (FDI) attacks on control input channels. Unlike existing methods that focus primarily on steady-state convergence, our approach guarantees transient safety, ensuring that system states remain within predefined safety bounds even during attack initiation a critical aspect overlooked in prior research. Given the reduction of network inertia by increasing the penetration of inverted-based renewables, large overshooting and intense fluctuations are more likely to occur during transients caused by disturbances and cyber-attacks. To mitigate these risks, the proposed control method enhances defense capabilities against polynomially unbounded FDI attacks, maintaining safe system trajectories for both frequency and voltage throughout the transient response. Through rigorous Lyapunov-based stability analysis, we formally certify the strategies to achieve uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) convergence in frequency and voltage regulation, and active power sharing across multi-inverter-based AC microgrids. Numerical simulation studies verify the effectiveness of the proposed control protocols, demonstrating improved system reliability, safety and resilience under adverse conditions.
Paper Structure (13 sections, 4 theorems, 22 equations, 5 figures)

This paper contains 13 sections, 4 theorems, 22 equations, 5 figures.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Preliminaries on Graph Theory and Notations
  3. Safety Preliminaries
  4. Standard Consensus Control in Isolated AC Microgrids
  5. Modeling of Unbounded Attacks
  6. Problem Formulation
  7. Safety Guarantees With Control Barrier Functions
  8. Resilient control Problem Formulation
  9. Fully Distributed Resilient Defense Strategies Design
  10. Validation and Results
  11. Case Study I: Resilience Against the Unbounded Attacks without safety constraints
  12. Case Study II: Transient-Safe and Resilience Against the Unbounded Attacks
  13. Conclusion

Key Result

Lemma 1

(ames2016control). For a CBF $h(x)$, define the set for $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $K_{c b f}(x)=\left\{u \in \mathbb{R}^m: L_f h(x)+L_g h(x) u+\alpha(h(x)) \geq 0\right\}$.

Figures (5)

  • Figure 1: Cyber-physical microgrid system: (a) Communication graph topology among four inverters and two leaders (references), (b) Microgrid test setup.
  • Figure 2: Performance of the resilient fully distributed resilient secondary defense strategies in Case I: frequency and voltage performance.
  • Figure 3: Trajectory of DG's output voltages and frequency usning the resilient control strategy without transient-safety.
  • Figure 4: Performance of the proposed fully distributed transient-safety resilient resilient secondary defense strategy in Case II: frequency and voltage performance.
  • Figure 5: Trajectory of DG's output voltages and frequency usning the proposed transient-safe and resilient control strategy

Theorems & Definitions (12)

  • Definition 1
  • Definition 2
  • Definition 3
  • Lemma 1
  • Remark 1
  • Definition 4: yz052802
  • Remark 2
  • Lemma 2: yz052802bidram2013secondary
  • Definition 5
  • Theorem 1
  • ...and 2 more