Unidirectional Key Update in Updatable Encryption, Revisited
M. Jurkiewicz, K. Prabucka
TL;DR
The paper addresses long-term encrypted storage by designing a post-quantum updatable encryption scheme with backward-leak uni-directionality, based on the lattice-hardness of $LWE$ and implemented atop FrodoPKE. The construction uses homomorphic-like key updates via update tokens and bit-ordering with Tensor-$D$ to achieve constant-size ciphertexts and keys across epochs. A security reduction to $LWE$ under standard lattice assumptions is provided, along with a firewall-based proof that the scheme maintains security in the backward-leak model. Empirical performance is evaluated for FrodoKEM-640/976/1344 at AES and SHAKE variants, showing token generation is the primary cost while decryption remains fast, indicating practical viability for scalable, post-quantum UE. Overall, the work combines strong directional security, post-quantum resilience, and practical efficiency for secure outsourced storage under long-term threat models.
Abstract
In this paper we construct a new efficient updatable encryption (UE) scheme based on FrodoPKE learning with errors key encapsulation. We analyse the security of the proposed scheme in the backward-leak uni-directional setting within the rand-ind-eu-cpa model. Since the underlying computationally hard problem here is LWE, the scheme is secure against both classical and quantum attacks.
