Logo
ScienceStack
Table of Contents
Fetching ...
Sign In

Strategic information disclosure with communication constraints and private preferences

Marcos M. Vasconcelos, Odilon Câmara

TL;DR

This work model the interaction between the platform and the users as a signaling game with asymmetric information, where each user optimizes its preference disclosure policy, and the platform optimizes its information disclosure policy.

Abstract

Social-media platforms are one of the most prevalent communication media today. In such systems, a large amount of content is generated and available to the platform. However, not all content can be transmitted to every possible user at all times. At the other end are the users, who have their own preferences about which content they enjoy, which is often unknown ex ante to the platform. We model the interaction between the platform and the users as a signaling game with asymmetric information, where each user optimizes its preference disclosure policy, and the platform optimizes its information disclosure policy. We provide structural as well as existence of policies that constitute Bayesian Nash Equilibria, and necessary optimality conditions used to explicitly compute the optimal policies.

Strategic information disclosure with communication constraints and private preferences

TL;DR

This work model the interaction between the platform and the users as a signaling game with asymmetric information, where each user optimizes its preference disclosure policy, and the platform optimizes its information disclosure policy.

Abstract

Social-media platforms are one of the most prevalent communication media today. In such systems, a large amount of content is generated and available to the platform. However, not all content can be transmitted to every possible user at all times. At the other end are the users, who have their own preferences about which content they enjoy, which is often unknown ex ante to the platform. We model the interaction between the platform and the users as a signaling game with asymmetric information, where each user optimizes its preference disclosure policy, and the platform optimizes its information disclosure policy. We provide structural as well as existence of policies that constitute Bayesian Nash Equilibria, and necessary optimality conditions used to explicitly compute the optimal policies.
Paper Structure (7 sections, 1 theorem, 10 equations, 2 figures)

This paper contains 7 sections, 1 theorem, 10 equations, 2 figures.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Problem setup
  3. Communication constraints
  4. Game sequence
  5. Agent's Loss function
  6. Solution concept
  7. Main Result

Key Result

Proposition 1

If the platform uses a WQD policy, $\gamma(x_1,x_2,m)$, the equilibrium estimation policy $\eta^\star$ is:

Figures (2)

  • Figure 1: Schematic diagram for the strategic information transmission problem in the presence of private receiver preferences.
  • Figure 2: Weighted Quadratic Disclosure Policy with $w_m=1/2$. The ellipsoids correspond to the level curves of a zero-mean bivariate Gaussian probability density with independent components with variances 1 and 2, respectively.

Theorems & Definitions (5)

  • Definition 1
  • Definition 2
  • Remark 1
  • Proposition 1
  • proof