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A Distributed Malicious Agent Detection Scheme for Resilient Power Apportioning in Microgrids

Vivek Khatana, Soham Chakraborty, Govind Saraswat, Sourav Patel, Murti V. Salapaka

TL;DR

This work addresses the vulnerability of distributed DER-based power apportioning to malicious or misbehaving agents in microgrids. It introduces a distributed intruder detection scheme that augments the standard consensus-based dispatch with local anomaly checks, link isolation, and a 1-bit consensus for propagating detections, enabling honest DERs to isolate compromised neighbors. Malicious behavior is modeled as a linear drift in true states, showing potential bias in the aggregate dispatch, which the proposed scheme mitigates by reconfiguring the communication graph and re-running the apportioning. The approach is validated via a controller-hardware-in-the-loop demonstration on a University of Minnesota campus-inspired microgrid, demonstrating detection within seconds across attack scenarios and topologies, and resulting in resilient ancillary service dispatch to meet the central core demand. The results highlight improved resilience and scalability for distributed DER coordination in realistic, heterogeneous microgrids.

Abstract

We consider the framework of distributed aggregation of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) in power networks to provide ancillary services to the power grid. Existing aggregation schemes work under the assumption of trust and honest behavior of the DERs and can suffer when that is not the case. In this article, we develop a distributed detection scheme that allows the DERs to detect and isolate the maliciously behaving DERs. We propose a model for the maliciously behaving DERs and show that the proposed distributed scheme leads to the detection of the malicious DERs. Further, augmented with the distributed power apportioning algorithm the proposed scheme provides a framework for resilient distributed power apportioning for ancillary service dispatch in power networks. A controller-hardware-in-the-loop (CHIL) experimental setup is developed to evaluate the performance of the proposed resilient distributed power apportioning scheme on an 8-commercial building distribution network (Central Core) connected to a 55 bus distribution network (External Power Network) based on the University of Minnesota Campus. A diversity of DERs and loads are included in the network to generalize the applicability of the framework. The experimental results corroborate the efficacy of the proposed resilient distributed power apportioning for ancillary service dispatch in power networks.

A Distributed Malicious Agent Detection Scheme for Resilient Power Apportioning in Microgrids

TL;DR

This work addresses the vulnerability of distributed DER-based power apportioning to malicious or misbehaving agents in microgrids. It introduces a distributed intruder detection scheme that augments the standard consensus-based dispatch with local anomaly checks, link isolation, and a 1-bit consensus for propagating detections, enabling honest DERs to isolate compromised neighbors. Malicious behavior is modeled as a linear drift in true states, showing potential bias in the aggregate dispatch, which the proposed scheme mitigates by reconfiguring the communication graph and re-running the apportioning. The approach is validated via a controller-hardware-in-the-loop demonstration on a University of Minnesota campus-inspired microgrid, demonstrating detection within seconds across attack scenarios and topologies, and resulting in resilient ancillary service dispatch to meet the central core demand. The results highlight improved resilience and scalability for distributed DER coordination in realistic, heterogeneous microgrids.

Abstract

We consider the framework of distributed aggregation of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) in power networks to provide ancillary services to the power grid. Existing aggregation schemes work under the assumption of trust and honest behavior of the DERs and can suffer when that is not the case. In this article, we develop a distributed detection scheme that allows the DERs to detect and isolate the maliciously behaving DERs. We propose a model for the maliciously behaving DERs and show that the proposed distributed scheme leads to the detection of the malicious DERs. Further, augmented with the distributed power apportioning algorithm the proposed scheme provides a framework for resilient distributed power apportioning for ancillary service dispatch in power networks. A controller-hardware-in-the-loop (CHIL) experimental setup is developed to evaluate the performance of the proposed resilient distributed power apportioning scheme on an 8-commercial building distribution network (Central Core) connected to a 55 bus distribution network (External Power Network) based on the University of Minnesota Campus. A diversity of DERs and loads are included in the network to generalize the applicability of the framework. The experimental results corroborate the efficacy of the proposed resilient distributed power apportioning for ancillary service dispatch in power networks.
Paper Structure (12 sections, 1 theorem, 6 equations, 3 figures, 2 tables)

This paper contains 12 sections, 1 theorem, 6 equations, 3 figures, 2 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Literature Review
  3. Contributions
  4. Description of the System
  5. Description of the Microgrid
  6. Distributed Power Apportioning
  7. Malicious Behavior of DERs
  8. Resilient Distributed Power Apportioning
  9. CHIL Demonstration and Results
  10. Experimental Configuration
  11. Results and Discussions
  12. Conclusion and Future Work

Key Result

Theorem 1

Let Assumption assmp:trust_beginning hold. Then the detection scheme detailed above and in Fig. fig:detection_and_chilfig:detection_scheme leads to detecting any malicious DER obscuring its true states via eq:intruder_model.

Figures (3)

  • Figure 1: Figure of (a) power network of the microgrid under study, (b) communication topology used in the power apportioning.
  • Figure 2: (a) Resilient distributed power apportioning scheme with malicious DER $m$. Honest DER $i$ detects the presence of $m$, (b) Laboratory CHIL setup.
  • Figure 3: Performance of the distributed power apportioning scheme with malicious hsDu detection under $\mathtt{ATTACK}$-$\mathtt{1}$ (a)-(d) and-$\mathtt{ATTACK}$-$\mathtt{2}$ (e)-(h).

Theorems & Definitions (3)

  • Remark 1
  • Theorem 1
  • proof