Lightweight and Resilient Signatures for Cloud-Assisted Embedded IoT Systems
Saif E. Nouma, Attila A. Yavuz
TL;DR
<3-5 sentence high-level summary> This work tackles the challenge of scalable, secure authentication for resource-constrained IoT by introducing two signatures, LRSHA and FLRSHA, that combine commitment separation with hardware-assisted distributed verification. The signer is kept computationally lightweight by offloading commitment handling to a network of TEEs (ComC servers), while FLRSHA adds forward security through key evolution without central trust or heavy verification burden. The authors provide formal security proofs (HD-EU-CMA and FHD-EU-CMA) and validate performance through full implementations on commodity hardware and 8-bit MCUs, demonstrating large speedups, compact keys/signatures, and robust breach resilience. The work also emphasizes practical deployment via open-source code and a realistic IoT/cloud model that avoids single-point-of-failure roots of trust.</paper_summary>
Abstract
Digital signatures provide scalable authentication with non-repudiation and are vital tools for the Internet of Things (IoT). Many IoT applications harbor vast quantities of resource-limited devices often used with cloud computing. However, key compromises (e.g., physical, malware) pose a significant threat to IoTs due to increased attack vectors and open operational environments. Forward security and distributed key management are critical breach-resilient countermeasures to mitigate such threats. Yet forward-secure signatures are exorbitantly costly for low-end IoTs, while cloud-assisted approaches suffer from centrality or non-colluding semi-honest servers. In this work, we create two novel digital signatures called Lightweight and Resilient Signatures with Hardware Assistance (LRSHA) and its Forward-secure version (FLRSHA). They offer a near-optimally efficient signing with small keys and signature sizes. We synergize various design strategies, such as commitment separation to eliminate costly signing operations and hardware-assisted distributed servers to enable breach-resilient verification. Our schemes achieve magnitudes of faster forward-secure signing and compact key/signature sizes without suffering from strong security assumptions (non-colluding, central servers) or a heavy burden on the verifier (extreme storage, computation). We formally prove the security of our schemes and validate their performance with full-fledged open-source implementations on both commodity hardware and 8-bit AVR microcontrollers.
