Robustness of the public transport network against attacks on its routes
Tomás Cicchini, Inés Caridi, Leonardo Ermannn
TL;DR
This paper investigates the robustness of public transport networks to attacks that remove entire bus routes, using three network representations (L-space, L'-space, and C-space) and a suite of route-attack strategies. It evaluates both a synthetic, SAW-based PTN model and a real-world Buenos Aires AMBA network to compare betweenness-based and one-step maximal-harm strategies against other centrality measures and random failures. The results show that betweenness-based attacks are particularly effective at fragmenting networks into several comparably sized components, while maximal one-step strategies can also be highly damaging to the giant component in certain regimes. The study highlights differences between synthetic and real networks, suggests refinements to synthetic models to better capture real-world robustness, and provides insights for designing more resilient PTNs and future mobility-focused analyses.
Abstract
We investigate the robustness of Public Transport Networks (PTNs) when subjected to route attacks, focusing specifically on public bus lines. Such attacks, mirroring real-world scenarios, offer insight into the multifaceted dynamics of cities. Our study delves into the consequences of systematically removing entire routes based on strategies that use centrality measures. We evaluate the network's robustness by analyzing the sizes of fragmented networks, focusing on the largest components and derived metrics. To assess the efficacy of various attack strategies, we employ them on both a synthetic PTN model and a real-world example, specifically the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area in Argentina. We examine these strategies and contrast them with random, and one-step most and least harmful procedures. Our findings indicate that \textit{betweenness}-based attacks and the one-step most (\textit{maximal}) harmful procedure emerge as the most effective attack strategies. Remarkably, the \textit{betweenness} strategy partitions the network into components of similar sizes, whereas alternative approaches yield one dominant and several minor components.
