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CountChain: A Decentralized Oracle Network for Counting Systems

Behkish Nassirzadeh, Stefanos Leonardos, Albert Heinle, Anwar Hasan, Vijay Ganesh

TL;DR

The gametheoretical analysis demonstrates that a Nash equilibrium exists wherein all rational parties participate with honesty in the CountChain system, a decentralized oracle network for counting systems.

Abstract

Blockchain integration in industries like online advertising is hindered by its connectivity limitations to off-chain data. These industries heavily rely on precise counting systems for collecting and analyzing off-chain data. This requires mechanisms, often called oracles, to feed off-chain data into smart contracts. However, current oracle solutions are ill-suited for counting systems since the oracles do not know when to expect the data, posing a significant challenge. To address this, we present CountChain, a decentralized oracle network for counting systems. In CountChain, data is received by all oracle nodes, and any node can submit a proposition request. Each proposition contains enough data to evaluate the occurrence of an event. Only randomly selected nodes participate in a game to evaluate the truthfulness of each proposition by providing proof and some stake. Finally, the propositions with the outcome of True increment the counter in a smart contract. Thus, instead of a contract calling oracles for data, in CountChain, the oracles call a smart contract when the data is available. Furthermore, we present a formal analysis and experimental evaluation of the system's parameters on over half a million data points to obtain optimal system parameters. In such conditions, our game-theoretical analysis demonstrates that a Nash equilibrium exists wherein all rational parties participate with honesty.

CountChain: A Decentralized Oracle Network for Counting Systems

TL;DR

The gametheoretical analysis demonstrates that a Nash equilibrium exists wherein all rational parties participate with honesty in the CountChain system, a decentralized oracle network for counting systems.

Abstract

Blockchain integration in industries like online advertising is hindered by its connectivity limitations to off-chain data. These industries heavily rely on precise counting systems for collecting and analyzing off-chain data. This requires mechanisms, often called oracles, to feed off-chain data into smart contracts. However, current oracle solutions are ill-suited for counting systems since the oracles do not know when to expect the data, posing a significant challenge. To address this, we present CountChain, a decentralized oracle network for counting systems. In CountChain, data is received by all oracle nodes, and any node can submit a proposition request. Each proposition contains enough data to evaluate the occurrence of an event. Only randomly selected nodes participate in a game to evaluate the truthfulness of each proposition by providing proof and some stake. Finally, the propositions with the outcome of True increment the counter in a smart contract. Thus, instead of a contract calling oracles for data, in CountChain, the oracles call a smart contract when the data is available. Furthermore, we present a formal analysis and experimental evaluation of the system's parameters on over half a million data points to obtain optimal system parameters. In such conditions, our game-theoretical analysis demonstrates that a Nash equilibrium exists wherein all rational parties participate with honesty.
Paper Structure (16 sections, 1 theorem, 3 equations, 7 figures, 2 tables)

This paper contains 16 sections, 1 theorem, 3 equations, 7 figures, 2 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Preliminaries
  3. Decentralized Oracle Networks (DONs)
  4. Related Work
  5. Description of CountChain
  6. System Assumptions
  7. Setup and Terminology
  8. System Description
  9. Reward and Penalty
  10. Limitations of CountChain
  11. Game Theory: The Verifier's Dilemma
  12. Experimental Evaluation
  13. Preliminary and Experimental Setup
  14. Experiment 1: Optimal System Parameters
  15. Experiment 2: Sybil Attack Success Rate
  16. ...and 1 more sections

Key Result

Theorem 1

Assume that a fraction $p_T\in(0,1]$ of propositions are True and that searching for a valid proof incurs a cost $c>0$ to the verifier. Then, if all other verifiers are behaving honestly, i.e., search for valid proofs and vote True whenever they find one, then it is best for a remaining verifier to

Figures (7)

  • Figure 1: General DON vs. Counting System DON Design
  • Figure 2: An Overview of CountChain
  • Figure 3: Pseudocode for the Host and Verifiers
  • Figure 4: A verifier needs to make two decisions: whether to put effort with sunk cost $-c$ and search for proof and if they find proof, whether to use it and vote "True" or ignore it and vote "False".
  • Figure 5: Optimal Honesty Rate and the Number of Verifiers
  • ...and 2 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (2)

  • Theorem 1: Incentive Compatibility of CountChain
  • proof