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On Classical Determinate Truth

Luca Castaldo, Carlo Nicolai

TL;DR

The paper develops a family of type-free, fully classical theories of truth with a defined determinateness predicate, achieving full compositionality and Kripke–Feferman–style semantics via a classical closure. Key results show that the determinateness class can be captured without primitive notions by defining determinateness through truth—specifically using $\mathrm{D}x\;\equiv\;\mathrm{TT}x \lor \mathrm{TF}x$—and that the resulting systems (notably $\mathsf{CD}^+_{\rm T}$ and its classical closure $\mathsf{CKF}_{\mathsf{cs}}$) are $\mathbb{N}$-categorical, mutually interpretable, and align with the Kripke fixed-point closures of consistent theories. The work compares these to Fujimoto–Halbach’s $\mathsf{CD}^+$ and $\mathsf{KF}$-based approaches, showing that while traditional primitive-determinateness predicates complicate semantic analysis, a truth-derived determinateness supports both robust semantic rules and strong generalization power. It also analyzes complete, symmetric, and mixed fixed-points, locating CKF-style variants as robust, well-behaved closures and identifying open questions about mixed-model viability and extensions via reflection principles. Overall, the framework provides a coherent, classical account of truth and determinateness that preserves compositionality, yields transparent deep theories, and produces precise model-theoretic characterizations anchored in Kripke–Feferman semantics.

Abstract

The paper proposes and studies new classical, type-free theories of truth and determinateness with unprecedented features. The theories are fully compositional, strongly classical (namely, their internal and external logics are both classical), and feature a \emph{defined} determinateness predicate satisfying desirable and widely agreed principles. The theories capture a conception of truth and determinateness according to which the generalizing power associated with the classicality and full compositionality of truth is combined with the identification of a natural class of sentences -- the determinate ones -- for which clear-cut semantic rules are available. Our theories can also be seen as the \emph{classical closures} of Kripke-Feferman truth: their $ω$-models, which we precisely pinned down, result from including in the extension of the truth predicate the sentences that are satisfied by a Kripkean closed-off fixed point model. The theories compare to recent theories proposed by Fujimoto and Halbach, featuring a primitive determinateness predicate. In the paper we show that our theories entail all principles of Fujimoto and Halbach's theories, and are proof-theoretically equivalent to Fujimoto and Halbach's $\cdplus$. {We also show establish some negative results on Fujimoto and Halbach's theories: such results show that, unlike what happens in our theories, the primitive determinateness predicate prevents one from establishing clear and unrestricted semantic rules for the language with type-free truth.

On Classical Determinate Truth

TL;DR

The paper develops a family of type-free, fully classical theories of truth with a defined determinateness predicate, achieving full compositionality and Kripke–Feferman–style semantics via a classical closure. Key results show that the determinateness class can be captured without primitive notions by defining determinateness through truth—specifically using —and that the resulting systems (notably and its classical closure ) are -categorical, mutually interpretable, and align with the Kripke fixed-point closures of consistent theories. The work compares these to Fujimoto–Halbach’s and -based approaches, showing that while traditional primitive-determinateness predicates complicate semantic analysis, a truth-derived determinateness supports both robust semantic rules and strong generalization power. It also analyzes complete, symmetric, and mixed fixed-points, locating CKF-style variants as robust, well-behaved closures and identifying open questions about mixed-model viability and extensions via reflection principles. Overall, the framework provides a coherent, classical account of truth and determinateness that preserves compositionality, yields transparent deep theories, and produces precise model-theoretic characterizations anchored in Kripke–Feferman semantics.

Abstract

The paper proposes and studies new classical, type-free theories of truth and determinateness with unprecedented features. The theories are fully compositional, strongly classical (namely, their internal and external logics are both classical), and feature a \emph{defined} determinateness predicate satisfying desirable and widely agreed principles. The theories capture a conception of truth and determinateness according to which the generalizing power associated with the classicality and full compositionality of truth is combined with the identification of a natural class of sentences -- the determinate ones -- for which clear-cut semantic rules are available. Our theories can also be seen as the \emph{classical closures} of Kripke-Feferman truth: their -models, which we precisely pinned down, result from including in the extension of the truth predicate the sentences that are satisfied by a Kripkean closed-off fixed point model. The theories compare to recent theories proposed by Fujimoto and Halbach, featuring a primitive determinateness predicate. In the paper we show that our theories entail all principles of Fujimoto and Halbach's theories, and are proof-theoretically equivalent to Fujimoto and Halbach's . {We also show establish some negative results on Fujimoto and Halbach's theories: such results show that, unlike what happens in our theories, the primitive determinateness predicate prevents one from establishing clear and unrestricted semantic rules for the language with type-free truth.
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