Accreditation Against Limited Adversarial Noise
Andrew Jackson
TL;DR
The paper addresses trustworthy verification of near-term quantum computations under a limited adversarial noise model. It extends an existing accreditation protocol by introducing a cryptographic-adversarial framework with Alice, Bob, and Robert, plus redaction-based concealment and the SPSCL_beta error model, enabling robust verification without IID assumptions. The core contributions are the formal problem setting, definitions of redaction classes and CPTP lists, the design of an adversarial accreditation protocol with encrypted trap/target outputs, and a provable bound on the ideal-actual variation distance for the target circuit. This approach preserves near-term efficiency and practicality while enhancing resilience to adversarial-like noise, with potential extensions to more general noise models in hardware.
Abstract
I present an accreditation protocol (a variety of quantum verification) where error is assumed to be adversarial (in contrast to the assumption error is implemented by identical CPTP maps used in previous accreditation protocols) - albeit slightly modified to reflect physically motivated error assumptions. This is achieved by upgrading a pre-existing accreditation protocol (from [S. Ferracin et al. Phys. Rev. A 104, 042603 (2021)]) to function correctly in the face of adversarial error, with no diminution in efficiency or suitability for near-term usage.
