Multiwinner Temporal Voting with Aversion to Change
Valentin Zech, Niclas Boehmer, Edith Elkind, Nicholas Teh
TL;DR
This work investigates two-stage committee elections with evolving voter preferences, formalizing Resilient Committee Elections (RCE) under Thiele rules. It establishes a complete complexity dichotomy: RCE is solvable in polynomial time for Approval Voting but coNP-hard (and coW[1]-hard in k) for every other Thiele rule, a result that extends to greedy Thiele rules. The authors also provide parameterized algorithms (FPT/XP) for natural parameters and report extensive experiments on contiguity, tie-breaking, and replacement patterns, highlighting the practical impact of tie handling. Overall, the paper clarifies the computational limits of maintaining stable committees over time in approval-based settings and connects these limits to both theory and empirical behavior.
Abstract
We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in identifying a winning committee for the second stage that overlaps as much as possible with the first-stage committee. We show a full complexity dichotomy for the class of Thiele rules: this problem is tractable for Approval Voting (AV) and hard for all other Thiele rules (including, in particular, Proportional Approval Voting and the Chamberlin-Courant rule). We extend this dichotomy to the greedy variants of Thiele rules. We also explore this problem from a parameterized complexity perspective for several natural parameters. We complement the theory with experimental analysis: e.g., we investigate the average number of changes in the committee as a function of changes in voters' preferences and the role of ties.
