Perception-guided Jailbreak against Text-to-Image Models
Yihao Huang, Le Liang, Tianlin Li, Xiaojun Jia, Run Wang, Weikai Miao, Geguang Pu, Yang Liu
TL;DR
The paper addresses safety vulnerabilities in Text-to-Image models by introducing Perception-guided Jailbreak (PGJ), a model-free, black-box method that uses LLMs to automate safe substitutions under the PSTSI principle. By replacing unsafe words with perceptually similar but semantically different phrases, PGJ bypasses pre-checkers while preserving image semantics, achieving high attack success and diverse NSFW outputs with natural prompts. Extensive experiments across six T2I models and a 1,000-prompt NSFW dataset show PGJ outperforming baselines in ASR and image diversity, while remaining efficient and robust to detection. The work highlights significant security implications for deployed T2I systems and points to future work on circumventing post-checkers and strengthening defenses.
Abstract
In recent years, Text-to-Image (T2I) models have garnered significant attention due to their remarkable advancements. However, security concerns have emerged due to their potential to generate inappropriate or Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) images. In this paper, inspired by the observation that texts with different semantics can lead to similar human perceptions, we propose an LLM-driven perception-guided jailbreak method, termed PGJ. It is a black-box jailbreak method that requires no specific T2I model (model-free) and generates highly natural attack prompts. Specifically, we propose identifying a safe phrase that is similar in human perception yet inconsistent in text semantics with the target unsafe word and using it as a substitution. The experiments conducted on six open-source models and commercial online services with thousands of prompts have verified the effectiveness of PGJ.
