Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Resource Allocation Without Monetary Transfers
Moise Blanchard, Patrick Jaillet
TL;DR
The paper studies sequential resource allocation among $n$ strategic agents without monetary transfers, quantifying how quickly the central planner’s welfare approaches the first-best under both finite horizon $T$ and infinite-horizon discounting with factor $\gamma$. It introduces the promised-utility framework and two geometric lemmas to characterize the achievable utility regions, yielding universal rates of $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{1-\gamma})$ (or $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{T})$) and, under structural conditions on utility distributions, faster rates up to $\mathcal{O}(1-\gamma)$ (or $\mathcal{O}(1/T)$). The results unify finite-horizon and infinite-horizon settings and provide constructive mechanisms that realize these rates, with faster convergence in smooth-full-information or highly interconnected utility profiles and slower rates for discrete distributions. The analysis offers deep insights into how planner flexibility to reward or penalize agents, while managing social welfare costs, governs the speed of convergence to the first-best and informs practical design of near-optimal, moneyless allocation mechanisms. These tools and findings have implications for scheduling, public service provisioning, and distributed resource management where monetary transfers are undesirable or infeasible.
Abstract
We study the problem in which a central planner sequentially allocates a single resource to multiple strategic agents using their utility reports at each round, but without using any monetary transfers. We consider general agent utility distributions and two standard settings: a finite horizon $T$ and an infinite horizon with $γ$ discounts. We provide general tools to characterize the convergence rate between the optimal mechanism for the central planner and the first-best allocation if true agent utilities were available. This heavily depends on the utility distributions, yielding rates anywhere between $1/\sqrt T$ and $1/T$ for the finite-horizon setting, and rates faster than $\sqrt{1-γ}$, including exponential rates for the infinite-horizon setting as agents are more patient $γ\to 1$. On the algorithmic side, we design mechanisms based on the promised-utility framework to achieve these rates and leverage structure on the utility distributions. Intuitively, the more flexibility the central planner has to reward or penalize any agent while incurring little social welfare cost, the faster the convergence rate. In particular, discrete utility distributions typically yield the slower rates $1/\sqrt T$ and $\sqrt{1-γ}$, while smooth distributions with density typically yield faster rates $1/T$ (up to logarithmic factors) and $1-γ$.
