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A Lower Bound for Local Search Proportional Approval Voting

Sonja Kraiczy, Edith Elkind

TL;DR

This work resolves an open question about the polynomial-time convergence of bounded local search for Proportional Approval Voting when the improvement threshold $\varepsilon$ is arbitrarily small. It proves a super-polynomial lower bound, $\Omega(k^{\log k})$, on the length of improving sequences for $0^+$-ls-PAV under adversarial better-response, by constructing a polynomial-size election built from hierarchical building blocks $E(j,k)$ and their aggregations $E^t(j,k)$. The result extends to a fixed lexicographic pivoting rule, showing that even with a deterministic swap order, the process may take super-polynomial time, while leaving open the best-response variant. The paper also provides empirical comparisons (in the extended version) suggesting that better-response can be faster in practice, and argues that these findings justify the previously used threshold $\varepsilon=\frac{n}{k^2}$ to balance fairness and tractability.

Abstract

Selecting $k$ out of $m$ items based on the preferences of $n$ heterogeneous agents is a widely studied problem in algorithmic game theory. If agents have approval preferences over individual items and harmonic utility functions over bundles -- an agent receives $\sum_{j=1}^t\frac{1}{j}$ utility if $t$ of her approved items are selected -- then welfare optimisation is captured by a voting rule known as Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). PAV also satisfies demanding fairness axioms. However, finding a winning set of items under PAV is NP-hard. In search of a tractable method with strong fairness guarantees, a bounded local search version of PAV was proposed by Aziz et al. It proceeds by starting with an arbitrary size-$k$ set $W$ and, at each step, checking if there is a pair of candidates $a\in W$, $b\not\in W$ such that swapping $a$ and $b$ increases the total welfare by at least $\varepsilon$; if yes, it performs the swap. Aziz et al.~show that setting $\varepsilon=\frac{n}{k^2}$ ensures both the desired fairness guarantees and polynomial running time. However, they leave it open whether the algorithm converges in polynomial time if $\varepsilon$ is very small (in particular, if we do not stop until there are no welfare-improving swaps). We resolve this open question, by showing that if $\varepsilon$ can be arbitrarily small, the running time of this algorithm may be super-polynomial. Specifically, we prove a lower bound of~$Ω(k^{\log k})$ if improvements are chosen lexicographically. To complement our lower bound, we provide an empirical comparison of two variants of local search -- better-response and best-response -- on several real-life data sets and a variety of synthetic data sets. Our experiments indicate that, empirically, better response exhibits faster running time than best response.

A Lower Bound for Local Search Proportional Approval Voting

TL;DR

This work resolves an open question about the polynomial-time convergence of bounded local search for Proportional Approval Voting when the improvement threshold is arbitrarily small. It proves a super-polynomial lower bound, , on the length of improving sequences for -ls-PAV under adversarial better-response, by constructing a polynomial-size election built from hierarchical building blocks and their aggregations . The result extends to a fixed lexicographic pivoting rule, showing that even with a deterministic swap order, the process may take super-polynomial time, while leaving open the best-response variant. The paper also provides empirical comparisons (in the extended version) suggesting that better-response can be faster in practice, and argues that these findings justify the previously used threshold to balance fairness and tractability.

Abstract

Selecting out of items based on the preferences of heterogeneous agents is a widely studied problem in algorithmic game theory. If agents have approval preferences over individual items and harmonic utility functions over bundles -- an agent receives utility if of her approved items are selected -- then welfare optimisation is captured by a voting rule known as Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). PAV also satisfies demanding fairness axioms. However, finding a winning set of items under PAV is NP-hard. In search of a tractable method with strong fairness guarantees, a bounded local search version of PAV was proposed by Aziz et al. It proceeds by starting with an arbitrary size- set and, at each step, checking if there is a pair of candidates , such that swapping and increases the total welfare by at least ; if yes, it performs the swap. Aziz et al.~show that setting ensures both the desired fairness guarantees and polynomial running time. However, they leave it open whether the algorithm converges in polynomial time if is very small (in particular, if we do not stop until there are no welfare-improving swaps). We resolve this open question, by showing that if can be arbitrarily small, the running time of this algorithm may be super-polynomial. Specifically, we prove a lower bound of~ if improvements are chosen lexicographically. To complement our lower bound, we provide an empirical comparison of two variants of local search -- better-response and best-response -- on several real-life data sets and a variety of synthetic data sets. Our experiments indicate that, empirically, better response exhibits faster running time than best response.
Paper Structure (16 sections, 8 theorems, 12 equations, 3 figures)

This paper contains 16 sections, 8 theorems, 12 equations, 3 figures.

Key Result

Theorem 2

For every $k\geq 1$ there exists a committee election with $\mathrm{poly}(k)$ voters, a committee $W_0$, $|W_0|=k$, and a sequence of $\Omega(k^2)$ swaps starting from $W_0$ such that each swap in this sequence strictly increases the PAV score by at least $\frac{n}{k^2}$.

Figures (3)

  • Figure 1: For $k=3$ and initial committee $W=\{c_1,c_2,c_3\}$ , $\frac{n}{k^2}$-ls-PAV would replace a member of $W$ with one of $c_4,c_5$ in the instance in Figure \ref{['sixtythirty']}, but not in the instance in Figure \ref{['noise']}.
  • Figure 2: Highlighted candidates are in the committee; arrows from $a$ to $b$ labelled with $t$ indicate that $a$ is replaced by $b$ in iteration $t$. Observe that pink candidates are only replaced by pink candidates; similarly, blue candidates are only replaced by blue candidates. This illustrates a swap sequence similar to that in the proof of Theorem \ref{['thm:threshold']}, with the exception that, to make the figure visually appealing, we display an equal number of blue and pink candidates.
  • Figure 3: We illustrate the sequence of swaps in Theorem \ref{['thm:zerolow']} by a small example. Each one of the $23$$3\times 4$ grids shows 12 candidates, one for each empty square, the 4 coloured ones indicating candidates currently in the committee. The empty squares in column $i$ are the candidates in $C_i$; they are ordered as $c_{i,1},c_{i,2},c_{i,3}$ from top to bottom. We omit the dummy candidates from this picture, and let $k_1=4$ and $t+1=3$, as larger $t$ is only necessary for the sequence length in the proof. An arrow indicates the swap that will transform the current committee into the next committee. The top left initial committee is $\{c_{1,3},c_{2,3},c_{3,3},c_{4,1}\}$ and the bottom right final committee is $\{c_{1,3},c_{2,3},c_{3,3},c_{4,3}\}$.

Theorems & Definitions (9)

  • Conjecture 1: left open by AE+18
  • Theorem 2
  • Theorem 3
  • Proposition 4
  • Lemma 4
  • Corollary 5
  • Proposition 6
  • Proposition 6
  • Theorem 7