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Authenticated partial correction over AV-MACs: toward characterization and coding

Duncan Koepke, Michaela Schnell, Madelyn St. Pierre, Allison Beemer

TL;DR

This work studies $\gamma$ partial correction over a $t$-user AV-MAC, defining the problem so that at least a $\gamma$ fraction of users' messages are decoded correctly in each transmission. It develops necessary channel conditions—extensions of symmetrizability and overwritability—that determine when the $\gamma$-partial-correction authentication capacity region $\mathscr{C}_{auth,\gamma}$ has nonempty interior, and proposes a block-length extension scheme that preserves positive rates from short zero-error codes by concatenating an inner $\gamma$-correcting code with outer erasure codes. A concrete channel, $W^{+}_{t,\ell}$, is analyzed to verify the necessary conditions and to characterize zero-error $\gamma$-partial-correction codes, including a two-user example with Sperner-type bounds and a discussion for three or more users. The results advance understanding of authentication and partial correction in adversarial multi-user settings and suggest practical coding strategies for maintaining reliable portions of messages under adversarial erasures, with future work on sufficiency proofs, refined extension schemes, and inner bounds for the $\mathscr{C}_{auth,\gamma}$ region.

Abstract

In this paper we study $γ$ partial correction over a $t$-user arbitrarily varying multiple-access channel (AV-MAC). We first present necessary channel conditions for the $γ$ partially correcting authentication capacity region to have nonempty interior. We then give a block length extension scheme which preserves positive rate tuples from a short code with zero probability of $γ$ partial correction error, noting that the flexibility of $γ$ partial correction prevents pure codeword concatenation from being successful. Finally, we offer a case study of a particular AV-MAC satisfying the necessary conditions for partial correction.

Authenticated partial correction over AV-MACs: toward characterization and coding

TL;DR

This work studies partial correction over a -user AV-MAC, defining the problem so that at least a fraction of users' messages are decoded correctly in each transmission. It develops necessary channel conditions—extensions of symmetrizability and overwritability—that determine when the -partial-correction authentication capacity region has nonempty interior, and proposes a block-length extension scheme that preserves positive rates from short zero-error codes by concatenating an inner -correcting code with outer erasure codes. A concrete channel, , is analyzed to verify the necessary conditions and to characterize zero-error -partial-correction codes, including a two-user example with Sperner-type bounds and a discussion for three or more users. The results advance understanding of authentication and partial correction in adversarial multi-user settings and suggest practical coding strategies for maintaining reliable portions of messages under adversarial erasures, with future work on sufficiency proofs, refined extension schemes, and inner bounds for the region.

Abstract

In this paper we study partial correction over a -user arbitrarily varying multiple-access channel (AV-MAC). We first present necessary channel conditions for the partially correcting authentication capacity region to have nonempty interior. We then give a block length extension scheme which preserves positive rate tuples from a short code with zero probability of partial correction error, noting that the flexibility of partial correction prevents pure codeword concatenation from being successful. Finally, we offer a case study of a particular AV-MAC satisfying the necessary conditions for partial correction.
Paper Structure (10 sections, 15 theorems, 24 equations)

This paper contains 10 sections, 15 theorems, 24 equations.

Key Result

Theorem 3.1

A $t$-user AV-MAC is $m$-overwritable for some $m\in [t]$ if and only if $\mathscr{C}_{\text{auth}}$ has empty interior. Otherwise, $\mathscr{C}_{\text{auth}}=\mathscr{C}$.

Theorems & Definitions (37)

  • Definition 2.1
  • Definition 2.2
  • Definition 2.3
  • Definition 2.4
  • Theorem 3.1
  • Lemma 3.2
  • Theorem 3.3
  • proof
  • Example 4.1
  • Lemma 4.2
  • ...and 27 more