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Distribution System Reconfiguration to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks via Stackelberg Games

Sajjad Maleki, E. Veronica Belmaga, Charalambos Konstantinou, Subhash Lakshminarayana

TL;DR

This paper addresses the cybersecurity risk of load-altering attacks (LAAs) in distribution networks with high IoT penetration by deriving closed-form voltage expressions under LAAs and formulating a reactive defense as a Stackelberg game. It introduces a Bayesian-optimized solution to compute equilibrium actions efficiently and demonstrates that DN reconfiguration, aided by inverter-based DERs, can mitigate LAA impacts while minimizing switching. The results on IEEE test feeders show improved voltage regulation under various attack scenarios, including uncertainty in attack localization and resource-constrained attackers, with DERs enhancing resilience and fewer auxiliary links reducing defense effectiveness. The work provides a practical, scalable framework for DN cyber-resilience that integrates topology control, DER flexibility, and game-theoretic decision-making to protect grid operation against strategic LAAs.

Abstract

The widespread integration of IoT-controllable devices (e.g., smart EV charging stations and heat pumps) into modern power systems enhances capabilities but introduces critical cybersecurity risks. Specifically, these devices are susceptible to load-altering attacks (LAAs) that can compromise power system safety. This paper quantifies the impact of LAAs on nodal voltage constraint violations in distribution networks (DNs). We first present closed-form expressions to analytically characterize LAA effects and quantify the minimum number of compromised devices for a successful LAA. Based on these insights, we propose a reactive defense mechanism that mitigates LAAs through DN reconfiguration. To address strategic adversaries, we then formulate defense strategies using a non-cooperative sequential game, which models the knowledgeable and strategic attacker, accounting for the worst-case scenario and enabling the reactive defender to devise an efficient and robust defense. Further, our formulation also accounts for uncertainties in attack localization. A novel Bayesian optimization approach is introduced to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium, significantly reducing computational burden efficiently. The game-theoretic strategy effectively mitigates the attack's impact while ensuring minimal system reconfiguration.

Distribution System Reconfiguration to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks via Stackelberg Games

TL;DR

This paper addresses the cybersecurity risk of load-altering attacks (LAAs) in distribution networks with high IoT penetration by deriving closed-form voltage expressions under LAAs and formulating a reactive defense as a Stackelberg game. It introduces a Bayesian-optimized solution to compute equilibrium actions efficiently and demonstrates that DN reconfiguration, aided by inverter-based DERs, can mitigate LAA impacts while minimizing switching. The results on IEEE test feeders show improved voltage regulation under various attack scenarios, including uncertainty in attack localization and resource-constrained attackers, with DERs enhancing resilience and fewer auxiliary links reducing defense effectiveness. The work provides a practical, scalable framework for DN cyber-resilience that integrates topology control, DER flexibility, and game-theoretic decision-making to protect grid operation against strategic LAAs.

Abstract

The widespread integration of IoT-controllable devices (e.g., smart EV charging stations and heat pumps) into modern power systems enhances capabilities but introduces critical cybersecurity risks. Specifically, these devices are susceptible to load-altering attacks (LAAs) that can compromise power system safety. This paper quantifies the impact of LAAs on nodal voltage constraint violations in distribution networks (DNs). We first present closed-form expressions to analytically characterize LAA effects and quantify the minimum number of compromised devices for a successful LAA. Based on these insights, we propose a reactive defense mechanism that mitigates LAAs through DN reconfiguration. To address strategic adversaries, we then formulate defense strategies using a non-cooperative sequential game, which models the knowledgeable and strategic attacker, accounting for the worst-case scenario and enabling the reactive defender to devise an efficient and robust defense. Further, our formulation also accounts for uncertainties in attack localization. A novel Bayesian optimization approach is introduced to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium, significantly reducing computational burden efficiently. The game-theoretic strategy effectively mitigates the attack's impact while ensuring minimal system reconfiguration.
Paper Structure (36 sections, 30 equations, 12 figures, 8 tables, 1 algorithm)

This paper contains 36 sections, 30 equations, 12 figures, 8 tables, 1 algorithm.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Literature Survey
  3. Research Gap and Contributions
  4. Preliminaries
  5. DN Model
  6. Load Model
  7. ZIP Load Model
  8. ZP Approximation
  9. Power Flow Equations
  10. Branch Flow Model
  11. Linearized Distribution Flow
  12. Reconfiguration of DN
  13. Inverter-Based DER
  14. Load-Altering Attack Model
  15. EVCS Load Altering Attack
  16. ...and 21 more sections

Figures (12)

  • Figure 1: Summary of the proposed attacker-defender interaction.
  • Figure 2: Power demand dependence of an air conditioner on voltage in accordance with ZIP and ZP models. The green zone illustrates the voltage constraints in this research, and the yellow zone is the accurate region of the ZP approximation
  • Figure 3: Defense timeline against LAA.
  • Figure 4: Base configuration of the test cases
  • Figure 5: Voltage profile of the attacked (on Bus 18) 33-bus test case with the proposed closed-form equations and the accurate model.
  • ...and 7 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (2)

  • Definition 1
  • Definition 2