Event Trojan: Asynchronous Event-based Backdoor Attacks
Ruofei Wang, Qing Guo, Haoliang Li, Renjie Wan
TL;DR
This work introduces Event Trojan, a framework for backdoor attacks directly injected into asynchronous event streams. It proposes two trigger paradigms—immutable and mutable—with the latter using adaptive time stamps learned to maximize attack effectiveness while preserving stealth, guided by a dedicated loss that combines cosine similarity and distributional alignment. Across two public event datasets and 22 victim models, the mutable trigger generally achieves higher attack success and maintains benign accuracy better than the immutable trigger, even under defense methods like Neural Polarizer; representation-based triggers show limitations due to inaccessibility of event representations during inference. The results highlight significant security concerns for event-based vision tasks and call for defense-focused research to mitigate such backdoor risks in real-world deployments.
Abstract
As asynchronous event data is more frequently engaged in various vision tasks, the risk of backdoor attacks becomes more evident. However, research into the potential risk associated with backdoor attacks in asynchronous event data has been scarce, leaving related tasks vulnerable to potential threats. This paper has uncovered the possibility of directly poisoning event data streams by proposing Event Trojan framework, including two kinds of triggers, i.e., immutable and mutable triggers. Specifically, our two types of event triggers are based on a sequence of simulated event spikes, which can be easily incorporated into any event stream to initiate backdoor attacks. Additionally, for the mutable trigger, we design an adaptive learning mechanism to maximize its aggressiveness. To improve the stealthiness, we introduce a novel loss function that constrains the generated contents of mutable triggers, minimizing the difference between triggers and original events while maintaining effectiveness. Extensive experiments on public event datasets show the effectiveness of the proposed backdoor triggers. We hope that this paper can draw greater attention to the potential threats posed by backdoor attacks on event-based tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/rfww/EventTrojan.
