Wigner's friend scenarios: on what to condition and how to verify the predictions
Flavio Del Santo, Gonzalo Manzano, Caslav Brukner
TL;DR
The paper addresses whether a single objective quantum state can describe a Wigner–friend scenario across observers. It develops an information-bubble framework and a bubble-switching game to test when an observer should adopt another bubble’s state assignment for prediction, incorporating a boundary interaction $U_ ext{int}$ parameterized by $ heta$ to modulate information leakage. The main contributions are formalizing bubbles as information-theoretic contexts, introducing a symmetric game that reveals when cross-bubble state assignments become advantageous, and showing that relative objectivity can emerge for both the friend and Wigner under suitable conditions (e.g., higher $ heta$ or specific measurements). The findings challenge the notion that Wigner always has superior predictive power, clarifying interpretational possibilities and suggesting a refined, context-dependent notion of objectivity with potential implications for quantum foundations and quantum reference-frame frameworks.
Abstract
Wigner's friend experiment and its modern extensions display the ambiguity of the quantum mechanical description regarding the assignment of quantum states. While the friend applies the state-update rule to the system upon observing an outcome of her measurement in a quantum system, Wigner describes the friend's measurement as a unitary evolution, resulting in an entangled state for the composite system of the friend and the system. In this respect, Wigner is often referred to as a "superobserver" who has the supreme technological ability to keep the friend's laboratory coherent. As such, it is often argued that he has the "correct" description of the state. Here we show that the situation is more symmetrical than is usually thought: there are different types of information that each of the observers has that the other fundamentally cannot have - they reside in different "bubbles" (in Calvalcanti's terminology). While this can explain why the objectivity of the state assignment is only relative to the bubble, we consider more elaborated situations in the form of a game in which the players can switch between bubbles. We find that, in certain circumstances, observers may be entitled to adopt and verify the state assignment from another bubble if they condition their predictions on \textit{all} information that is in principle available to them.
