Asymmetric Mempool DoS Security: Formal Definitions and Provable Secure Designs
Wanning Ding, Yibo Wang, Yuzhe Tang
TL;DR
This work addresses mempool DoS in public blockchains by introducing formal eviction-security definitions and the saferAd-CP admission policy. It proves eviction-based security via a lower bound on total mempool fees and implements a childless-eviction-based CP in Geth, achieving a monotonic price increase and provable resilience against asymmetric eviction DoS. Empirical evaluation on real Ethereum traces shows saferAd-CP yields negligible latency overhead and improves revenue stability under normal workloads, while dramatically increasing attacker costs under eviction attacks (by more than $10^4$). The results offer a formal framework and practical, provably secure mempool designs with direct implications for validator economics and MEV-enabled ecosystems.
Abstract
The mempool plays a crucial role in blockchain systems as a buffer zone for pending transactions before they are executed and included in a block. However, existing works primarily focus on mitigating defenses against already identified real-world attacks. This paper introduces secure blockchain-mempool designs capable of defending against any form of asymmetric eviction DoS attacks. We establish formal security definitions for mempools under the eviction-based attack vector. Our proposed secure transaction admission algorithm, named \textsc{saferAd-CP}, ensures eviction-security by providing a provable lower bound on the cost of executing eviction DoS attacks. Through evaluation with real transaction trace replays, \textsc{saferAd-CP} demonstrates negligible latency and significantly high lower bounds against any eviction attack, highlighting its effectiveness and robustness in securing blockchain mempools.
