Treatment of Statistical Estimation Problems in Randomized Smoothing for Adversarial Robustness
Vaclav Voracek
TL;DR
The paper tackles the high computational cost of certifying robustness in randomized smoothing by reframing the estimation problem as adaptive, sequential statistical inference. It introduces a strictly improved randomized Clopper-Pearson interval and, more importantly, confidence sequences to enable data-driven stopping and reduced sample complexity in certification tasks. The authors provide theoretical lower and upper bounds on the width of these intervals and sequences, show near-optimal adaptive performance, and validate the approach empirically on robustness tasks. This work enables faster, practically feasible certified robustness by replacing fixed-sample procedures with adaptive, time-uniform guarantees that balance type-1 and type-2 errors with sample availability. Overall, it broadens the applicability of randomized smoothing by making certification more efficient across modalities and threat models.
Abstract
Randomized smoothing is a popular certified defense against adversarial attacks. In its essence, we need to solve a problem of statistical estimation which is usually very time-consuming since we need to perform numerous (usually $10^5$) forward passes of the classifier for every point to be certified. In this paper, we review the statistical estimation problems for randomized smoothing to find out if the computational burden is necessary. In particular, we consider the (standard) task of adversarial robustness where we need to decide if a point is robust at a certain radius or not using as few samples as possible while maintaining statistical guarantees. We present estimation procedures employing confidence sequences enjoying the same statistical guarantees as the standard methods, with the optimal sample complexities for the estimation task and empirically demonstrate their good performance. Additionally, we provide a randomized version of Clopper-Pearson confidence intervals resulting in strictly stronger certificates.
