Bandits with Preference Feedback: A Stackelberg Game Perspective
Barna Pásztor, Parnian Kassraie, Andreas Krause
TL;DR
This work tackles bandit optimization with preference feedback over continuous, kernelized domains by introducing MAXMINLCB, a zero-sum Stackelberg acquisition that jointly selects action pairs using a kernelized, logistic-style confidence framework. By proving an equivalence between the dueling preference loss and a logistic loss under a dueling kernel, it derives anytime-valid confidence sets for the latent utility difference and builds a robust, information-theoretic regret bound $R^{\mathrm{D}}(T)=\mathcal{O}(\gamma_T^{\mathrm{D}}\sqrt{T})$. The method integrates a principled action-pair selection rule (Leader maximizes LCB, Follower responds) that balancing exploration and exploitation via a game-theoretic lens, and it demonstrates superior performance on diverse benchmarks and a real-world Yelp dataset. The results generalize beyond simple linear or finite domains, offering a scalable, principled framework for human-in-the-loop optimization and potential extensions to RLHF-like settings and welfare mechanisms. Overall, the paper advances theory and practice of kernelized preference-based bandits with robust confidence guarantees and practical efficacy.
Abstract
Bandits with preference feedback present a powerful tool for optimizing unknown target functions when only pairwise comparisons are allowed instead of direct value queries. This model allows for incorporating human feedback into online inference and optimization and has been employed in systems for fine-tuning large language models. The problem is well understood in simplified settings with linear target functions or over finite small domains that limit practical interest. Taking the next step, we consider infinite domains and nonlinear (kernelized) rewards. In this setting, selecting a pair of actions is quite challenging and requires balancing exploration and exploitation at two levels: within the pair, and along the iterations of the algorithm. We propose MAXMINLCB, which emulates this trade-off as a zero-sum Stackelberg game, and chooses action pairs that are informative and yield favorable rewards. MAXMINLCB consistently outperforms existing algorithms and satisfies an anytime-valid rate-optimal regret guarantee. This is due to our novel preference-based confidence sequences for kernelized logistic estimators.
