SoK: Analysis of Software Supply Chain Security by Establishing Secure Design Properties
Chinenye Okafor, Taylor R. Schorlemmer, Santiago Torres-Arias, James C. Davis
TL;DR
The paper addresses software supply chain vulnerability by formalizing a four-stage attack model and three security properties—transparency, validity, and separation. It then develops a framework to map diverse security practices to these properties and analyzes major approaches, including end-to-end systems (in-toto, Sigstore) and security frameworks (SCIM, SLSA, CNCF). Through case studies, it reveals an artifacts-focused bias and highlights gaps in addressing operations and actors, advocating defense-in-depth and integrated solutions. The work provides a practical reference to help system integrators, researchers, and vendors compare security postures and design more robust software supply chains. It emphasizes cohesive application of all three properties to reduce exploitation risk in real-world pipelines.
Abstract
This paper systematizes knowledge about secure software supply chain patterns. It identifies four stages of a software supply chain attack and proposes three security properties crucial for a secured supply chain: transparency, validity, and separation. The paper describes current security approaches and maps them to the proposed security properties, including research ideas and case studies of supply chains in practice. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches relative to known attacks and details the various security frameworks put out to ensure the security of the software supply chain. Finally, the paper highlights potential gaps in actor and operation-centered supply chain security techniques
