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Enhancing Security in Millimeter Wave SWIPT Networks

Rui Zhu

TL;DR

This paper studies the security performance in general mmWave SWIPT networks, and investigates the probability of successful eavesdropping under different attack models, and some design suggestions of mmWave SWIPT are provided to defend against eavesdropping attacks and achieve secure communication in practice.

Abstract

Millimeter wave (mmWave) communication encounters a major issue of extremely high power consumption. To address this problem, the simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) could be a promising technology. The mmWave frequencies are more appropriate for the SWIPT comparing to current low-frequency wireless transmissions, since mmWave base stations (BSs) can pack with large antenna arrays to achieve significant array gains and high-speed short-distance transmissions. Unfortunately, the implementation of SWIPT in the wireless communication may lead to an expanded defencelessness against the eavesdropping due to high transmission power and data spillage. It is conventionally believed that narrow beam offers inherent information-theoretic security against the eavesdropping, because only the eavesdroppers, which rely on the line-of-sight path between the legitimate transmitter and receiver, can receive strong enough signals. However, some mmWave experiments have shown that even by using highly directional mmWaves, the reflection signals caused by objects in the environment can be beneficial to the eavesdroppers. This paper studies the security performance in general mmWave SWIPT networks, and investigates the probability of successful eavesdropping under different attack models. Analytical expressions of eavesdropping success probability (ESP) of both independent and colluding eavesdroppers are derived by incorporating the random reflection paths in the environment. Theoretical analysis and simulation results reveal the effects of some key parameters on the ESP, such as the time switching strategy in SWIPT, densities of mmWave BSs, and carriers frequencies, etc. Based on the numerical and simulation results, some design suggestions of mmWave SWIPT are provided to defend against eavesdropping attacks and achieve secure communication in practice.

Enhancing Security in Millimeter Wave SWIPT Networks

TL;DR

This paper studies the security performance in general mmWave SWIPT networks, and investigates the probability of successful eavesdropping under different attack models, and some design suggestions of mmWave SWIPT are provided to defend against eavesdropping attacks and achieve secure communication in practice.

Abstract

Millimeter wave (mmWave) communication encounters a major issue of extremely high power consumption. To address this problem, the simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) could be a promising technology. The mmWave frequencies are more appropriate for the SWIPT comparing to current low-frequency wireless transmissions, since mmWave base stations (BSs) can pack with large antenna arrays to achieve significant array gains and high-speed short-distance transmissions. Unfortunately, the implementation of SWIPT in the wireless communication may lead to an expanded defencelessness against the eavesdropping due to high transmission power and data spillage. It is conventionally believed that narrow beam offers inherent information-theoretic security against the eavesdropping, because only the eavesdroppers, which rely on the line-of-sight path between the legitimate transmitter and receiver, can receive strong enough signals. However, some mmWave experiments have shown that even by using highly directional mmWaves, the reflection signals caused by objects in the environment can be beneficial to the eavesdroppers. This paper studies the security performance in general mmWave SWIPT networks, and investigates the probability of successful eavesdropping under different attack models. Analytical expressions of eavesdropping success probability (ESP) of both independent and colluding eavesdroppers are derived by incorporating the random reflection paths in the environment. Theoretical analysis and simulation results reveal the effects of some key parameters on the ESP, such as the time switching strategy in SWIPT, densities of mmWave BSs, and carriers frequencies, etc. Based on the numerical and simulation results, some design suggestions of mmWave SWIPT are provided to defend against eavesdropping attacks and achieve secure communication in practice.
Paper Structure (27 sections, 6 theorems, 46 equations, 14 figures, 2 tables)

This paper contains 27 sections, 6 theorems, 46 equations, 14 figures, 2 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Related Work
  3. Secure communication in mmWave networks
  4. SWIPT in mmWave networks
  5. Information-theoretic security in SWIPT networks
  6. Contributions and Organization
  7. System Model
  8. Network and SWIPT Model
  9. Obstacles and Reflectors Assumptions
  10. Channel Model
  11. Antenna Model
  12. Antenna Gain Distribution with Beam Misalignment
  13. Stochastic Geometry Framework
  14. LOS Link Distribution
  15. Reflection Link Distribution
  16. ...and 12 more sections

Key Result

Lemma 2.1

The antenna gain PDF $f_{G_{e}}(x)$ that is obtained by an arbitrary eavesdropper for $x \in [G_{m}, G_{s}]$ is given by where $F_{\theta_{\epsilon}}(x)$, $x \le \frac{\theta}{2}$ is the CDF of beam misalignment $\theta_{\epsilon}$.

Figures (14)

  • Figure 1: Downlink multiuser multicell interference scenario in a ultra-dense mmWave network. For clarity, eavesdroppers, the intercell and intracell interference are not shown in this figure.
  • Figure 2: Sector antenna model. $M, m, \theta, \upsilon$ denote the main lobe, side lobe, the half power beamwidth for the main lobe, and the half power beamwidth for the side lobe, respectively.
  • Figure 3: Antenna beam pattern misalignment between a mmWave BS and an eavesdropper. $\theta$ denotes the mainlobe beamwidth, and $\theta_{\epsilon}$ denotes the misalignment.
  • Figure 4: One realization of blockage in the mmWave communication in the real environment, where the mmWave BS located at $O$ has a height $H_{b}$, while the mobile user has a height $H_{u}$. 6840343
  • Figure 5: Geometry of the reflection path with blockage. Muhammad2017AnalyticalMF
  • ...and 9 more figures

Theorems & Definitions (11)

  • Lemma 2.1
  • proof
  • Corollary 2.1.1
  • Lemma 2.2
  • proof
  • Lemma 2.3
  • proof
  • Theorem 3.1
  • proof
  • Theorem 3.2
  • ...and 1 more