Logo
ScienceStack
Table of Contents
Fetching ...
Sign In

Resilient Random Time-hopping Reply against Distance Attacks in UWB Ranging

Wenlong Gou, Chuanhang Yu, Gang Wu

TL;DR

The paper tackles distance-reduction (e.g., Ghost Peak) attacks in UWB ranging by introducing a secure ranging scheme that employs random time-hopping without extra signaling and remains compatible with IEEE 802.15.4a/z. It combines the time-hopping DS-TWR method with an attack-detection module based on channel reciprocity and autoencoders, enabling dynamic switching to a higher-security mode when threats are detected. Theoretical analysis yields an attack-probability bound and a gain factor that scales with the randomized delay range, while simulations and hardware experiments demonstrate substantial reductions in attack success probability, down to near 0% in tested scenarios. The approach offers a low-overhead, backward-compatible enhancement to UWB security, with practical validation on commercial chips and clear avenues for broader network and frame-format optimization in the future.

Abstract

In order to mitigate the distance reduction attack in Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) ranging, this paper proposes a secure ranging scheme based on a random time-hopping mechanism without redundant signaling overhead. Additionally, a secure ranging strategy is designed for backward compatibility with existing standards such as IEEE 802.15.4a/z, combined with an attack detection scheme. The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed strategy are demonstrated through both simulation and experimental results in the case of the Ghost Peak attack, as demonstrated by Patrick Leu et al. The random time-hopping mechanism is verified to be capable of reducing the success rate of distance reduction attacks to less than 0.01%, thereby significantly enhancing the security of UWB ranging.

Resilient Random Time-hopping Reply against Distance Attacks in UWB Ranging

TL;DR

The paper tackles distance-reduction (e.g., Ghost Peak) attacks in UWB ranging by introducing a secure ranging scheme that employs random time-hopping without extra signaling and remains compatible with IEEE 802.15.4a/z. It combines the time-hopping DS-TWR method with an attack-detection module based on channel reciprocity and autoencoders, enabling dynamic switching to a higher-security mode when threats are detected. Theoretical analysis yields an attack-probability bound and a gain factor that scales with the randomized delay range, while simulations and hardware experiments demonstrate substantial reductions in attack success probability, down to near 0% in tested scenarios. The approach offers a low-overhead, backward-compatible enhancement to UWB security, with practical validation on commercial chips and clear avenues for broader network and frame-format optimization in the future.

Abstract

In order to mitigate the distance reduction attack in Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) ranging, this paper proposes a secure ranging scheme based on a random time-hopping mechanism without redundant signaling overhead. Additionally, a secure ranging strategy is designed for backward compatibility with existing standards such as IEEE 802.15.4a/z, combined with an attack detection scheme. The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed strategy are demonstrated through both simulation and experimental results in the case of the Ghost Peak attack, as demonstrated by Patrick Leu et al. The random time-hopping mechanism is verified to be capable of reducing the success rate of distance reduction attacks to less than 0.01%, thereby significantly enhancing the security of UWB ranging.
Paper Structure (16 sections, 10 equations, 7 figures, 3 tables)

This paper contains 16 sections, 10 equations, 7 figures, 3 tables.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. System Model and problem Statement
  3. Classic UWB Ranging Model and Attack
  4. Random Time-hopping Ranging Model Against Attacks
  5. Problem Statement
  6. Security Ranging scheme Design
  7. Overall Procedure
  8. Random Time-hopping Ranging without Redundant Signaling Overheads
  9. Random delay value preselection
  10. STS counter value reading
  11. Delay synchronization and distance calculation
  12. Performance Analysis
  13. Evaluation
  14. Numerical Simulation Evaluation
  15. Experimental Validation
  16. ...and 1 more sections

Figures (7)

  • Figure 1: Classic UWB ranging model and random time-hopping ranging model
  • Figure 2: Tmestamp acquisition
  • Figure 3: A security ranging strategy with attack detection and time-hopping DS-TWR for UWB
  • Figure 4: STS generation procedure in IEEE 802.15.4zy5
  • Figure 5: Missing detection probability and false alarm probability of the attack detection schemey15
  • ...and 2 more figures